Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, brought an action against defendant, who was the Commissioner of the Fisheries for the State of Alaska (Commissioner), asking the district court to declare that certain regulations, which shorten the fishing year and limited the number of salmon that commercial fishermen could harvest, were unconstitutional as a taking of property without just compensation and as a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their entry permits, that they had expressly waived any right to compensation with respect to their shore leases, and that they had not suffered a due process violation. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The court held that under Alaska law, plaintiffs have only a license, and not a protected property interest, in the entry permits. The court also held that plaintiffs contractually waived their right to challenge the regulations when they signed their lease agreements and the court declined to analyze their claims on the merits. The court further held that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Vandevere, et al. v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Illinois riverboat casinos filed a RICO suit (18 U.S.C. 1961) against racetracks, charging that the owner of two tracks, in cahoots with then-governor, Blagojevich, "bought" statutes requiring casinos to deposit three percent of their revenues to the "Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund" for disbursement to racetracks for use to increase purses and improve the tracks. The district judge issued, then dissolved, a temporary restraining order. The Seventh Circuit reinstated, so that no money is being disbursed, but on rehearing en banc, affirmed. The Tax Injunction Act forbids federal district courts to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law," if an adequate remedy is available in the state courts, as it is in Illinois 28 U.S.C. 1341. If unlawfulness can be traced to the racetracks, the casinos can seek damages from them. The Act does not bar federal monetary relief, but federal courts cannot freeze the state’s tax moneys by imposition of a constructive trust. The court extended the TRO for 30 days pending petition for certiorari. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Blagojevich" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from trial court orders granting preliminary injunctions and appointing receivers to take control of the assets of certain stores and operate them. In each of the five stores, the state filed civil actions under the Georgia RICO statute, OCGA 16-14-1 et seq., and named as in personam defendants the purported owners and operators of the stores, alleging that defendants each engaged in two or more acts of illegal commercial gambling. Defendants appealed the trial court's order granting the state's motions for interlocutory injunctions, which continued in effect the terms of the temporary restraining orders and continued the receivership. The court held that a RICO forfeiture was a proceeding that could be initiated by the state pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7 and that the procedures surrounding the orders granting the injunctions and continuing the receiverships did not violate due process where defendants were afforded the opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments. The court also held that the trial court's consideration of the question of in rem forfeitures constituting unconstitutionally excessive fines was premature, and the cases must be remanded for consideration of those issues when properly presented. The court further held that the evidence presented did demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues where it recited equitable arguments of both parties; and that the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to recuse a judge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Patel, et al. v. State, et al.; Check, et al. v. State, et al.; Duhwala, et al. v. State, et al.; Patel, et al. v. State, et al.; Mehta, et al. v. State, et al." on Justia Law

Gerald Kirke and Wild Rose Entertainment (collectively, defendants), entered into an agreement with John Pavone and Signature Management Group (collectively, plaintiffs), stating the ownership and management relationship between the parties upon the opening of casino projects within the state. Wild Rose later terminated the agreement, and plaintiffs sued defendants for breach of contract and other claims. The district court sustained defendants' motion for a directed verdict on most of plaintiffs' claims but allowed the breach of contract claims. After a jury trial, the district court found Wild Rose breached the agreement and awarded plaintiffs ten million dollars in damages. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case for judgment in favor of defendants. On review, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the appellate court and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding, inter alia, that the district court did not err in (1) overruling defendants' motion for a directed verdict on plaintiffs' breach of contract claims; (2) allowing the jury to award damages for a period of as much as thirty years; and (3) denying defendants' motion for a new trial. View "Pavone v. Kirke" on Justia Law

This case involved a stockholder challenge to the decision of two funds within the Vanguard mutual fund complex to purchase shares of allegedly illegal foreign online gambling businesses that were publicly traded in overseas capital markets. Plaintiffs' complaint asserted both derivative and direct claims based on their allegations that defendants' actions constituted a violation of their fiduciary duties, negligence, and waste. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court could not assert personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants named in the complaint; all plaintiffs' claims were derivative in nature and therefore, the complaint must be dismissed for plaintiffs' failure to make demand on the board of trustees or demonstrate why a demand would be futile; and the complaint failed to state a claim. The court granted defendants' motions and dismissed with prejudice all of the claims in the complaint based on the first two grounds. Consequently, the court did not address defendants' additional argument that the complaint failed to state a claim. View "Hartsel, et al. v. The Vanguard Group, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The State of Michigan entered into a compact with the Bay Mills Indian Community pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C). The compact authorizes Bay Mills to conduct class III gaming activities (a casino) on Indian lands within the state, but prohibits it from doing so outside that territory. Bay Mills opened a second casino on land it had purchased through a congressionally established land trust. The Tribe claimed it could operate a casino there because the property qualified as Indian land. Michigan sued under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which allows a state to enjoin gaming activity conducted in violation of any tribal-state compact. The district court granted the injunction, but the Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit unless Congress provided otherwise; section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) only authorized suits to enjoin gaming activity located “on Indian lands,” while the complaint alleged the casino was outside such territory. The Supreme Court affirmed. As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise “inherent sovereign authority” that is subject to plenary control by Congress; unless Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority. Among the core aspects of that sovereignty is “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers,” which applies whether a suit is brought by a state or arises from a tribe’s commercial activities off Indian lands. IGRA’s plain terms do not authorize this suit. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) partially abrogates tribal immunity with respect to class III gaming located “on Indian lands,” but the premise of Michigan’s suit is that Bay Mills’ casino is unlawful because it is outside Indian lands. Michigan argues that the casino is licensed and operated from within the reservation and that such administrative action constitutes “class III gaming activity.” IGRA’s provisions and history indicate that “class III gaming activity” refers to the gambling that goes on in a casino, not the offsite licensing of such games. View "Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty" on Justia Law

The State of Michigan entered into a compact with the Bay Mills Indian Community pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C). The compact authorizes Bay Mills to conduct class III gaming activities (a casino) on Indian lands within the state, but prohibits it from doing so outside that territory. Bay Mills opened a second casino on land it had purchased through a congressionally established land trust. The Tribe claimed it could operate a casino there because the property qualified as Indian land. Michigan sued under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which allows a state to enjoin gaming activity conducted in violation of any tribal-state compact. The district court granted the injunction, but the Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit unless Congress provided otherwise; section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) only authorized suits to enjoin gaming activity located “on Indian lands,” while the complaint alleged the casino was outside such territory. The Supreme Court affirmed. As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise “inherent sovereign authority” that is subject to plenary control by Congress; unless Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority. Among the core aspects of that sovereignty is “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers,” which applies whether a suit is brought by a state or arises from a tribe’s commercial activities off Indian lands. IGRA’s plain terms do not authorize this suit. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) partially abrogates tribal immunity with respect to class III gaming located “on Indian lands,” but the premise of Michigan’s suit is that Bay Mills’ casino is unlawful because it is outside Indian lands. Michigan argues that the casino is licensed and operated from within the reservation and that such administrative action constitutes “class III gaming activity.” IGRA’s provisions and history indicate that “class III gaming activity” refers to the gambling that goes on in a casino, not the offsite licensing of such games. View "Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty" on Justia Law