Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Wild Rose Entertainment and Signature Management Group (SMG) entered into an agreement that delineated the parties' relationship with regard to future state casino projects. After Wild Rose was awarded a gaming license to develop a casino in Emmetsburg, it terminated the agreement. SMG sued Wild Rose for breach of contract, and a jury found Wild Rose breached the agreement. During the Emmetsburg action, Wild Rose was awarded a gaming license to develop a casino in Clinton. SMG then filed a separate action against Wild Rose, alleging that it breached paragraph 5A of the agreement by failing to negotiate in good faith with SMG for the management of the Clinton casino. Paragraph 5A was litigated in the Emmetsburg action. The district court granted summary judgment for Wild Rose, concluding the doctrine of claim preclusion barred SMG's current claim. The court of appeals affirmed after finding Wild Rose repudiated the entire agreement, which required SMG to seek damages for all remaining rights of performance under the contract in the first lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Wild Rose repudiated the agreement, and (2) the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the action. View "Pavone v. Kirke" on Justia Law

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.View "Amador County, California v. Kenneth Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after plaintiff was arrested for, among other things, possession of false identification documents, when he reported to an agent with the Enforcement Division of the Nevada Gaming Control Board ("NGCB") that MGM management had unlawfully denied him payment of his tickets at their casinos. The agent arrested plaintiff after casino records indicated that he had previously redeemed tickets under two different names and the charges against plaintiff were later dismissed. At issue was whether plaintiff's false arrest/false imprisonment, battery, and premises liability claims were properly dismissed under Nevada law and whether plaintiff's false arrest and conspiracy to commit false arrest claims were properly dismissed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where plaintiff admitted to the agent that he possessed and used an unofficial identification card and credit card with a different name to gamble at several Las Vegas casinos; where plaintiff's admissions provided the agent with probable cause to believe he had committed a crime and therefore permitting the agent to arrest him; and where, as a result, plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state plausible claims for false arrest, conspiracy to commit false arrest, false imprisonment, and premises liability under state and federal law.View "Alex Fayer v. Arthur Vaughn, et al" on Justia Law

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) randomly allocated championship tickets to applicants who had offered to purchase tickets by submitting the face value of the tickets along with a non-refundable handling fee. The face-value amount (but not the handling fee) was refunded to applicants whose offers were not accepted. Plaintiffs in this case submitted offers to the NCAA to purchase tickets for the NCAA Division I men's basketball tournament, but their offers were not accepted. Dissatisfied with not being able to purchase tickets, the plaintiffs filed suit against the NCAA in federal court, alleging several claims, the underlying basis being that the NCAA's ticket-distribution system constituted an unlawful lottery under state law. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that even if the NCAA was operating an illegal lottery, plaintiffs' claims were barred by in pari delicto because they were willing participants in it. On appeal, the majority of the appellate panel held that the ticket-distribution process was a lottery, and the in pari delicto defense was not available because the NCAA had a greater degree of fault than the plaintiffs. The NCAA appealed the decision, and the same appellate panel vacated its prior decision. Pursuant to state appellate procedure, the panel presented certified questions for Supreme Court consideration, in particular, whether the NCAA's ticket distribution process was an unlawful lottery. The Court found that state law does not define "lottery," and following its holding in Tinder, defined the term as "a scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance among those who provided … consideration." The Court found that the NCAA distribution scheme does not fall within definition, and is not an unlawful lottery under state law. View "George v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Sioux Falls requiring that an on-sale alcoholic beverage business seeking to place video lottery machines in the establishment must meet certain location requirements and apply for a conditional use permit. Plaintiff Rick Law, who conditionally held a liquor license, brought a declaratory action against the City to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The South Dakota Lottery intervened in the action. The circuit court ruled that the City exceeded its authority when it enacted the ordinance, concluding that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory scheme indicated that the State intended to fully occupy the field of video lottery to the exclusion of municipal regulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) municipalities do not have the freedom or power to regulate video lottery as the South Dakota Constitution specifically reserves that right to the State and (2) existing legislation does not give municipalities power to license video lottery establishments or otherwise control the location of such establishments. View "Law v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law

The Tribe operates a Wisconsin casino and financed investment in a Natchez, Mississippi riverboat casino by issuing bonds backed by casino revenue. The bank, as trustee, alleged that the Tribe had breached a bond indenture and sought appointment of a receiver to manage the trust security on behalf of the bondholder. The district court dismissed, holding that the indenture was void, as a gaming facility management contract not approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission (25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(9), 2711(a)(1)), and that the Tribe's waiver of sovereign immunity in the indenture was consequently void. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The indenture was void so that the waiver of sovereign immunity cannot serve as a predicate for jurisdiction. The district court should have permitted the bank to file an amended complaint to the extent that it presented claims for legal and equitable relief in connection with the bond transaction on its own behalf and on behalf of the bondholder so that it could address whether the bank has standing to litigate claims on behalf of the bondholder and determine whether collateral documents, when read separately or together, waive sovereign immunity with respect to any such claims. View "Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Assn v. Lake of the Torches Econ. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case pertained to a "class-of-one" equal protection lawsuit against a county government based on its demand that a property owner correct a nuisance. Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC alleged that after it and Cherokee County became involved in litigation concerning a casino development agreement, the County health department targeted Kansas Penn for a regulatory enforcement action. In particular, the County sent Kansas Penn a notice stating that the unkempt condition of its property violated state and local nuisance laws and regulations and warning that failure to clean up the property would lead to an enforcement action. Although the County never brought an enforcement action against Kansas Penn, Kansas Penn sued the County and some of its officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In its complaint, Kansas Penn alleged the notice of nuisance violated its right to equal protection by arbitrarily and maliciously singling it out for selective enforcement. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Kansas Penn failed to state a claim for relief under the standard set forth by "Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly," the Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint. View "Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, et al" on Justia Law

Siblings Michael and Desiree Mendoza attended a wedding reception at the Santa Ana Star Casino operated by Petitioner, Tamaya Enterprises, Inc. (the Casino), where they were served alcoholic beverages and became intoxicated.  Casino employees continued to serve Michael and Desiree alcohol despite their apparent intoxication.  Michael and Desiree left the Casino and were killed when their vehicle left the roadway and rolled over.  Suit was filed in state court against the Casino claiming that the Casino's delivery of alcohol to Michael and Desiree while they were obviously intoxicated was in violation of state law and proximately caused their deaths. The Casino sought to dismiss the suit, claiming the state court lacked jurisdiction over a dram shop action where the tavernkeeper's duty not to serve alcohol to an intoxicated person is imposed by tribal law, not state law, and where the tribal law contains a provision reserving exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal courts. The Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a question of state court jurisdiction in a dram shop action brought under the Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact (the Compact), negotiated between the State of New Mexico and the Pueblo of Santa Ana pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. There was a conflict between Section 8 of the Compact which provides for state court jurisdiction where a casino visitor has been injured by the conduct of a casino, and Section 191 of the Pueblo of Santa Ana Liquor Ordinance, which reserves exclusive jurisdiction to tribal courts.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that New Mexico state courts properly exercise jurisdiction over casino visitors' personal injury claims pursuant to the Compact.  The second issue concerns the two types of common law dram shop claims:  claims brought by third parties injured by the conduct of the intoxicated patron against a tavernkeeper (third-party claims) and claims brought by the intoxicated patron against the tavernkeeper to recover for his own injuries (patron claims).  The Court considered the status of such common law claims following the codification of dram shop liability in the Liquor Control Act.  Due to the explicit language contained in the act that limits its application to taverns licensed under New Mexico law, the Court held that the Act was not intended to preempt all common law  claims.  Accordingly, because the Act does not preempt all common law claims, the common law recognizes an action by a third party against a tavernkeeper for over service of alcohol.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the result reached by the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Mendoza v. Tamaya Enters, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, brought an action against defendant, who was the Commissioner of the Fisheries for the State of Alaska (Commissioner), asking the district court to declare that certain regulations, which shorten the fishing year and limited the number of salmon that commercial fishermen could harvest, were unconstitutional as a taking of property without just compensation and as a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their entry permits, that they had expressly waived any right to compensation with respect to their shore leases, and that they had not suffered a due process violation. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The court held that under Alaska law, plaintiffs have only a license, and not a protected property interest, in the entry permits. The court also held that plaintiffs contractually waived their right to challenge the regulations when they signed their lease agreements and the court declined to analyze their claims on the merits. The court further held that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Vandevere, et al. v. Lloyd" on Justia Law