Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants worked for Sports Off Shore (SOS), a gambling business based in Antigua. After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of violations of the Wire Act and other offenses for conducting an illegal gambling business. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding, as regarding Defendants’ common challenges to their convictions, that (1) the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the safe harbor provision of the Wire Act; (2) Defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence failed because the Wire Act applies to the internet; (3) Defendants could be convicted of violating the Wire Act despite their ignorance of the law; (4) Defendants’ convictions were not an improper extraterritorial application of the Wire Act; (5) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendants even though SOS accepted bets on forms of gambling not covered by the Wire Act; and (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a directory of all SOS employees. View "United States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Tribe bought land from the City of Lansing to build a class III gaming facility, using funds appropriated by Congress for the benefit of certain Michigan tribes. The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act provides that land acquired with the income on these funds shall be held in trust by the federal government. Michigan obtained an injunction to prevent the Tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the submission would violate a compact between the state and the Tribe. That compact requires that a tribe seeking to have land taken into trust for gaming purposes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B), secure a revenue-sharing agreement with other tribes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state did not seek to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, so IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the property at issue will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe. View "Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe" on Justia Law

After Appellant, the Wynn Las Vegas, restructured its table-games department, it implemented a new tip-pooling policy for its table-games employees. Under the new policy, all tips were gathered and divided among the dealers, boxpersons, and casino service team leads. Respondents, several dealers, filed a class-action complaint with the Labor Commissioner claiming that Appellant's restructured tip-pooling policy violated laws governing compensation and employment practices because it required the dealers to share their tips with employees of different ranks. The Commissioner determined that Appellant's new tip-pooling policy did not violate Nevada law. The district court set aside the Commissioner's decision, determining that the new policy violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.160 because the policy directly benefited Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in overturning the Commissioner's decision because Appellant did not keep any of the tips from the pool but, rather, distributed the money among its employees. View "Wynn Las Vegas, LLC v. Baldonado" on Justia Law

Seeking to address illegal sports wagering and to improve its economy, New Jersey sought to license gambling on rofessional and amateur sporting events. Sports leagues sought to block those efforts, claiming, with the United States intervening, that the proposed law violates the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. 3701, which prohibits most states from licensing sports gambling. New Jersey argued that the leagues lacked standing because they suffer no injury from legalization of wagering on their games and that PASPA was beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. The state claimed that PASPA violates principles under the system of dual state and federal sovereignty: the “anti-commandeering” doctrine, on the ground that PASPA impermissibly prohibits states from enacting legislation to license sports gambling; and the “equal sovereignty” principle, in that PASPA permits Nevada to license sports gambling while banning other states from doing so. The district court enjoined New Jersey from licensing sports betting. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the leagues have Article III standing to enforce PASPA and that PASPA is constitutional. The court noted that accepting New Jersey’s arguments would require extraordinary steps, including invalidating a law under the anti-commandeering principle (the Supreme Court has only twice done so) and expanding that principle to suspend commonplace operations of the Supremacy Clause over state activity contrary to federal laws. View "Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

A “millionaire party” involves betting on games of chance customarily associated with a gambling casino, using imitation money or chips that have a nominal value equal to or greater than the value of the currency for which they can be exchanged, Mich. Comp. Laws 432.103a(8). Millionaire-party licenses may be issued to a “qualified organization” for up to four consecutive days at a single location. Proceeds from a millionaire party, less “reasonable” expenses incurred to operate the event, must be “devoted exclusively” to the charitable purposes of the licensee. Following denial of licenses for millionaire parties to be held at adult businesses, plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that they were deprived of their constitutionally protected status as an “approved lessor” for millionaire parties without due process of law. They claim that the state adopted a blanket policy of denying all such applications in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercising their First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning retaliation must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, but that being an “approved lessor” is not a protected entitlement. View "Top Flight Entm't, Ltd. v. Schuette" on Justia Law

The State seized thirty-seven gaming machines called "eight-liners" after the sheriff's department executed a warrant to search a game room owned by Sammy Barnes. The warrant was obtained after an investigation, which yielded information that the eight-liners were awarding players tickets they could redeem for future play on another day, referred to as non-immediate rights of replay. Barnes challenged the seizure, contending that his eight-liners were statutorily excluded from the definition of "gambling device" because the contrivances rewarded players "exclusively with noncash merchandise, prizes, toys, or novelties." The trial court ordered the eight-liners forfeited to the State. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the eight-liners fell within the exclusion to the definition of "gambling devices" because the non-immediate rights of replay could be considered "novelties" under the exclusion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that non-immediate rights of replay are not novelties, and therefore, the eight-liners did not fall within the exclusion because the distributed tickets were not redeemable exclusively for noncash merchandise, prizes, toys, or novelties. View "State v. $1,760 in U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a video game publishing agreement entered into by Timegate and Gamecock. Under the terms of the agreement, Timegate was to be the developer and Gamecock was to be the publisher of a futuristic military-style video game entitled "Section 8." When their business relationship deteriorated, the parties proceeded with arbitration and the arbitrator awarded Gamecock monetary compensation and a perpetual license in the video game's intellectual property. The district court vacated the arbitrator's award, determining that the perpetual license was not consistent with the "essence" of the underlying contract. Because the agreement bestowed broad remedial powers upon the arbitrator and because it was fraudulently induced and irreversibly violated by Timegate, the perpetual license was a rational and permissible attempt to compensate Gamecock and maintain the agreement's essence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, finding that the perpetual license was a remedy that furthered the essence of the publishing agreement. View "TimeGate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth's attorney for the City of Portsmouth informed Plaintiff, who hosted Texas Hold 'Em poker games and tournaments, that, to avoid prosecution, Plaintiff must cease and desist "all forms of illegal gambling." Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the game of Texas Hold 'Em constitutes illegal gambling under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-325 and whether Va. Code Ann. 18.2-328 was facially unconstitutional and should be found void for vagueness. The circuit court ruled against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgment to the extent the circuit court ruled that Plaintiff failed to establish that Texas Hold 'Em was not illegal gambling under section 18.2-325, as the claim did not present a justiciable controversy, and the circuit court did not have the authority to exercise jurisdiction concerning such a claim; and (2) affirmed the court's judgment to the extent the court ruled that section 18.2-328 was not unconstitutional. View "Daniels v. Mobley" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a jury verdict in favor of a racing official should have been reinstated. The racing official, who had been suspended by the Delaware Harness Racing Commission, claimed that the Commission reneged on its promise to reinstate him. The jury agreed, but the trial court later determined that the racing official's claim failed as a matter of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the racing official's promissory estoppel claim which was accepted by the jury, subjected the Commission to liability. The trial court also held that the jury verdict was excessive and against the great weight of the evidence, thereby justifying a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the Commission was reversed, but disagreed that the verdict was excessive and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Harmon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

IGT owns patents related to “wheel games,” casino gaming machines containing a secondary bonus game incorporating a spinning wheel. IGT sued Bally for infringement and Bally counterclaimed under state and federal antitrust laws. The district court denied motions for summary judgment on the antitrust issues, granted the motions that the patents were invalid and not infringed, and certified the patent issues for interlocutory appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment against Bally on its antitrust counterclaims. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that the undisputed facts were insufficient to establish the existence of a relevant antitrust market in wheel games. View "IGT v. Alliance Gaming Corp." on Justia Law