Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Native American Law
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The Fond du Luth Casino in Duluth opened in 1986 as a joint venture between the city and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa and is operated by the Band. The 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act led to restructuring of agreements between the Band and the city under a 1994 consent decree, under which the Band paid the city $75 million 1994-2009, 19 percent of gross revenues. The Band stopped making payments in 2009, believing that they violated IGRA as interpreted by the National Indian Gaming Commission. In 2011, the Gaming Commission issued a Notice of Violation, determining that the payments violated IGRA requirements that tribes have the sole proprietary interest in casinos and are their primary beneficiaries. The Commission ordered the Band not to resume payments. The Band sought relief under FRCP 60(b)(6) from payments in 2009-2011. The district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit remanded and again reversed and remanded, finding that the district court failed to consider all of the factors identified in its 2013 order. The court must give proper weight to the congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming and the fact that the city was on notice in 2009 of Gaming Commission policies. View "Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

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Wisconsin’s Governor has entered into gaming compacts with all of the state’s tribes (Wis. Stat. 14.035). The HoChunk Nation adopted an ordinance, authorizing Class I and Class II gaming on its lands. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(6), (7), (8), defines Class I gaming as social games and traditional Indian gaming, regulated exclusively by tribes; Class II gaming includes bingo and certain nonbanked card games (players compete against one another rather than against the house) that are authorized by state laws. Class III gaming is a residual category, regulated under tribal-state compacts. A 2008 agreement between the state and the Nation does not restrict Class II gaming. Since 2010, the Nation has offered nonbanked electronic poker at Ho-Chunk Madison. Wisconsin sought an injunction to stop the poker, which, if classified as Class III would violate the Nation’s compact with the state. The district court ruled that the poker was a Class III game. The Seventh Circuit reversed. States may not prohibit a tribe from offering gaming that is roughly equivalent to what the state allows for its residents. A state must criminalize a gambling activity in order to prohibit the tribe from engaging in it. Wisconsin decriminalized nonbanked poker in 1999. IGRA does not permit interference with Class II poker on tribal land. View "Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation" on Justia Law

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In 1991, the Tulalip Tribes of Washington and the State of Washington signed a tribal-state gaming compact (the Tulalip Compact), which has since been amended numerous times. The Spokane Tribe did not participate in the collective negotiation process that led to the Tulalip Compact. In 2007, a compact between the Spokane Tribe and the State (the Spokane Compact) became effective. In 2010, Tulalip requested negotiations with the State to amend its compact to enable Tulalip to acquire additional licenses to video player terminals licenses to video player terminals for Class III gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. When negotiations broke down, Tulalip initiated suit, asserting that the “most-favored tribe” clause in the Tulalip Compact entitled it to the amendment because the mechanism was available to the Spokane Tribe but unavailable to Tulalip. The district court granted summary judgment to the State and denied Tulalip’s cross-motion for summary judgment. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the most-favored tribe clause did not require the State to adopt Tulalip’s proposed amendment because the amendment did not mirror the restrictions set forth the Spokane compact. View "Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. State of Washington" on Justia Law

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This matter came before the Court of Appeal for a third time; this matter stemmed from the California Valley Miwok Tribe's dispute with the Gambling Control Commission over money collected and held as a "non-compact tribe" under the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF). The Commission began withholding the distribution of RSTF funds to the Tribe when it became aware of a dispute over the tribe's membership and leadership as evidenced by ongoing proceedings and litigation involving the BIA's relationship with the Tribe. In its last opinion, the Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to lift a stay and to allow the parties to file dispositive motions. The parties filed their motions, and the trial court resolved them, entering judgment in favor of the Commission on its motion for summary judgment, which the Tribe then appealed. Finding that the Commission was properly withholding RSTF funds because it could not identify an undisputed tribal representative to receive them, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's decision. View "CA Valley Miwok Tribe v. CA Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

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The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief. View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law

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Stop the Casino 101 Coalition sought to invalidate a compact between the state and the Federated Indians of the Graton Rancheria authorizing the operation of a gaming casino on a 254-acre parcel in and adjacent to the City of Rohnert Park. The coalition claimed that because the state failed to explicitly cede to the Graton Tribe jurisdiction over the property, which was formerly held by private parties, federal law does not authorize the assumption of tribal jurisdiction over the property, so that the state’s entry into the compact violates the California constitutional provision authorizing such gaming compacts. The state countered that the coalition’s claim is essentially an attack on the validity of action taken by the federal government that cannot be challenged in these state court proceedings, and that in all events there has been no violation of either federal or state law. The appeals court affirmed dismissal of the challenge, citing federal approval of the plan under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701) and declining to “pass judgment on the contentious policy issues underlying the creation of Indian reservations for the purpose of constructing gaming casinos.”View "Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

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The Catawba Indian Nation brought a declaratory judgment action against the State (and Mark Keel) to determine the effect of the Gambling Cruise Act on its gambling rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, finding: (1) the Tribe's action was precluded by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata, and (2) the Gambling Cruise Act does not confer upon the Tribe the right to offer video poker and similar electronic play devices on its Reservation as the Act does not alter the statewide ban on video poker. The Tribe appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part: the circuit court's determination that the Gambling Cruise Act did not authorize the Tribe to offer video poker on its Reservation in contravention of the existing statewide ban on video gambling devices was affirmed; the Tribe's action was not precluded by collateral estoppel or res judicata, reversing this finding by the circuit court. View "Catawba Indian Nation v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

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In 1986, the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Band) entered into several agreements establishing a joint venture to operate gaming activities in Duluth. The agreements required that the Band seek approval before creating any additional Indian Country. In 1994, the Band and the City created a series of new agreements and amendments to the 1986 agreements. In 2010, the Band acquired a plot of land. The Band sought to have the plot placed in trust but did not seek the City’s approval to do so, as required by the 1986 agreements. The City commenced this action in state district court seeking a court order requiring the Band to withdraw its trust application. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Band had only consented to suit in federal court in the 1994 agreements. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the district court’s judgment for the Band, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Band breached the 1986 agreements because it required interpretation of the 1994 agreements, which was a matter vested in the federal courts. View "City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

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The Tribe bought land from the City of Lansing to build a class III gaming facility, using funds appropriated by Congress for the benefit of certain Michigan tribes. The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act provides that land acquired with the income on these funds shall be held in trust by the federal government. Michigan obtained an injunction to prevent the Tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the submission would violate a compact between the state and the Tribe. That compact requires that a tribe seeking to have land taken into trust for gaming purposes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B), secure a revenue-sharing agreement with other tribes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state did not seek to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, so IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the property at issue will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe. View "Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe" on Justia Law