Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal granted summary judgment to plaintiff St. Charles Gaming Company d/b/a Isle of Capri Casino Lake Charles ("Grand Palais"), holding the casino was a :vessel" for the purposes of general maritime law. The decision contradicted Benoit v. St. Charles Gaming Company, LLC, 233 So. 3d 615, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 104 (2018), which held the Grand Palais was not a vessel. Plaintiff Don Caldwell worked for Grand Palais Riverboat, LLC, and was injured when the gangway attached to the riverboat malfunctioned and collapsed. Plaintiff petitioned for damages, alleging the Grand Palais was a vessel under general maritime law, and that he was a seaman under the Jones Act at the time of the accident. After a de novo review of the record, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the Grand Palais was a not vessel under general maritime law. Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff’s suit. View "Caldwell v. St. Charles Gaming Company" on Justia Law

The Debtors own the Atlantic City Trump Taj Mahal casino. The union represents 1,136 employees. The 2011 collective bargaining agreement was to remain in effect through September 14, 2014 and continue in full force and effect from year to year thereafter, unless either party served 60 days written notice of its intention to terminate, modify, or amend. In March 2014, the Debtors gave notice of their “intention to terminate, modify or amend” and sought to begin negotiations. The Union initially declined. On August 20 the parties met. The Debtors emphasized their critical financial situation. No agreement was reached. The Debtors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On September 11, the Debtors asked the Union to extend the term of the CBA. The Union refused. The CBA expired. On September 17, the Debtors sent the Union a proposal with supporting documentation. After meetings, the Debtors successfully moved, under section 1113, to reject the CBA and implement the terms of the Debtors’ last proposal, asserting that rejection of the CBA was necessary to the reorganization.While 11 U.S.C. 1103 allows a debtor to terminate a CBA under certain circumstances, the National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from unilaterally changing CBA terms even after its expiration; key terms of an expired CBA continue to govern until the parties reach a new agreement or bargain to impasse. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding section 1113 does not distinguish between the terms of an unexpired CBA and terms that continue to govern after the CBA expires. View "In re: Trump Entm't Resorts" on Justia Law

After Appellant, the Wynn Las Vegas, restructured its table-games department, it implemented a new tip-pooling policy for its table-games employees. Under the new policy, all tips were gathered and divided among the dealers, boxpersons, and casino service team leads. Respondents, several dealers, filed a class-action complaint with the Labor Commissioner claiming that Appellant's restructured tip-pooling policy violated laws governing compensation and employment practices because it required the dealers to share their tips with employees of different ranks. The Commissioner determined that Appellant's new tip-pooling policy did not violate Nevada law. The district court set aside the Commissioner's decision, determining that the new policy violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.160 because the policy directly benefited Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in overturning the Commissioner's decision because Appellant did not keep any of the tips from the pool but, rather, distributed the money among its employees. View "Wynn Las Vegas, LLC v. Baldonado" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a jury verdict in favor of a racing official should have been reinstated. The racing official, who had been suspended by the Delaware Harness Racing Commission, claimed that the Commission reneged on its promise to reinstate him. The jury agreed, but the trial court later determined that the racing official's claim failed as a matter of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the racing official's promissory estoppel claim which was accepted by the jury, subjected the Commission to liability. The trial court also held that the jury verdict was excessive and against the great weight of the evidence, thereby justifying a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the Commission was reversed, but disagreed that the verdict was excessive and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Harmon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Ondricko had been working in the gaming industry since 1994 and began working for MGM in 2003. MGM promoted Ondricko to floor supervisor in 2005. As a floor supervisor, she was responsible for supervising dealers at as many as six gaming tables in an area referred to as a “pit.” MGM claims it fired Ondricko because she participated in a “bad shuffle” at a blackjack table she was supervising. At least six other supervisors had engaged in misconduct related to shuffle procedures. Only two were terminated. She sued for race and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.37.2101. The district court found that Ondricko admitted the employment misconduct that resulted in her termination and that she had not shown disparate treatment of similarly situated comparators. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the misconduct was insufficient to justify termination and that Ondricko had established disparate treatment of male comparators. View "Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC" on Justia Law