Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the validity of a rule promulgated by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Respondent) mandating out-of-competition race horse drug testing. Petitioners commenced this hybrid article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding, alleging that the rule, referred to as the Out of Competition Testing Rule (OCTR) was not authorized by Respondent’s enabling legislation. Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that Respondent had acted in excess of its legislatively delegated power. The Appellate Division modified by effectively denying the petition, concluding that the OCTR was, for the most part, valid and that the rule’s promulgation lay within Respondent’s legislatively conferred authority to regulate and supervise race meets at which pari-mutuel wagering is permitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent possesses the power to promulgate rules mandating warrantless, out-of-competition equine testing for proscribed doping agents. View "Ford v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Bd." on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief. View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law

In 2009, intervenor-requestor James Schneller of Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against Gambling, sent an email to Catherine Stetler, a press aide in the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“GCB”), requesting copies of communications between the GCB and several applicants for gaming licenses, as well as copies of the financial data that each applicant provided to the GCB. He also asked for permission to speak at the GCB’s next public hearing, and copied his request to the GCB’s Director of Media Relations and Chief Enforcement Counsel. It was undisputed that requestor did not make mention of any open-records officer in his written request. The press aide responded to the written request by return email, wherein she apologized for having been out of the office and attached a public comment sign-up form with instructions to return the completed form for permission to comment at the GCB’s public hearing on the following day. The aide did not otherwise respond to the request for records, and did not forward the request to the GCB’s open-records officer. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the requirements for written Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) requests for access to public records, the proper application of the provision which directs that all such requests “must be addressed to the open-records officer.” The Court held that in order to establish a valid RTKL request sufficient to trigger appellate rights from a nonresponse under the RTKL, the requestor must address his request to the respective open-records officer as mandated in Section 703. View "PA Gaming Control Brd. v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law

Illinois legalized riverboat casino gambling in 1990. Since then, the state’s once‐thriving horseracing industry has declined. In 2006 and 2008, former Governor Blagojevich signed into law two bills that imposed a tax on in‐state casinos of 3% of their revenue and placed the funds into a trust for the benefit of the horseracing industry. Casinos filed suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964, alleging that defendants, members of the horseracing industry, bribed the governor. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the racetracks, finding sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that there was a pattern of racketeering activity; that a jury could find the existence of an enterprise‐in‐fact, consisting of Blagojevich, his associates, and others; sufficient evidence that the defendants bribed Blagojevich to secure his signature on the 2008 Act; but that the casinos could not show that the alleged bribes proximately caused their injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was enough to survive summary judgment on the claim that the governor agreed to sign the Act in exchange for a bribe. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston" on Justia Law

Effective July 1, 2009, the New Hampshire Legislature imposed a ten percent tax on gambling winnings (Gambling Winnings Tax). The Gambling Winnings Tax was repealed effective May 23, 2011. The repeal was not retroactive, meaning that the tax was assessed on gambling winnings between July 1, 2009, and May 22, 2011. Petitioner Leonard Willey was a New Hampshire resident who, for the three years preceding the filing of this action, derived almost all of his earned income from gambling. For the 2009 tax year, he owed no federal income tax because his gambling losses exceeded his winnings. Petitioner David Eby was not an original party to this action, but was added as a substitute party later in the case. He was a New Hampshire resident who, in May 2011, purchased a scratch ticket and won ten dollars on the ticket, and was required to pay one dollar under the Gambling Winnings Tax as a result. This class action was filed in 2010, by putative class representatives Dean Leighton and Leighton Family Enterprises, LLC and Willey. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the Gambling Winnings Tax was illegal and unconstitutional on its face, as applied to pre-enactment lottery winners receiving their winnings through annuities, and as applied to professional gamblers, as well as a refund of all such taxes collected or withheld. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State and dismissed petitioners' motion for summary judgment and remaining claims challenging the constitutionality of the state's tax on gambling winnings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: the Court disagreed with petitioners that a tax on gross gambling winnings was inherently “unfair, unreasonable, and disproportional” under the New Hampshire constitution. Because petitioners could not show that they suffered harm under the Commerce Clause, were professional gamblers, or were gambling winnings annuity recipients, they did not suffer the same injury as the members of the subclasses they claimed to represent, and thus they did not demonstrate their entitlement to act as class representatives for the members of those subclasses. The Gambling Winnings Tax neither lacked uniformity nor was disproportional and unreasonable; and petitioners lacked standing to bring their remaining challenges to the tax. View "Eby v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment appealed the Commonwealth Court's en banc decision overruling exceptions and affirming a panel decision of that court, which likewise affirmed the order of the Board of Finance and Review regarding calculation of a slot machine tax. Greenwood petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse the decision and hold that the relevant section of the Gaming Act (4 Pa.C.S. sections 1101-1904) allowed for the cost of promotional awards given away by the gaming facility to be subtracted prior to calculation of the "gross terminal revenue" for purposes of slot machine taxes. Upon review of the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings: "to be deductible, the promotional awards must result from playing slot machines, and Greenwood is obligated to prove as much. After review of the Stipulation, we conclude that questions of fact remain concerning whether the specific awards claimed are a 'result of playing a slot machine.'" View "Greenwood Gaming v. PA Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court focused on two appeals (case no. 1101384 and case no. 1110310) and two petitions for writs of mandamus (case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158) filed by the State of Alabama, all challenging orders entered by a circuit judge in Greene County requiring State officials to return to items seized by the State as contraband pursuant to search warrants previously issued by the Greene Court. In addition, the Supreme Court reviewed a petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1130598) filed by the State seeking relief from the refusal of a district judge in Greene County to issue warrants similar to the warrants involved in the first four cases based on evidentiary submissions similar to those provided by the State in those same four cases. The latter case involved the same potential defendants and gaming establishments as the first four cases, as well as similar gambling devices alleged by the State to be illegal. Moreover, the district judge in case no. 1130598 relied upon the judgment of the trial judge in the former cases in refusing to issue the warrants in that case. Upon review of the trial record of all parties' cases involved, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was asked to preemptively adjudicate (within the confines of a motion filed under Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P.) the lawfulness of property seized as contraband. The Court concluded the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore the Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court in case no. 1101384 and 1110310 and dismissed those actions. The Court dismissed the appeals in those cases, and the related petitions for writ of mandamus then pending in case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158. As to case no. 1130598, the Court, by separate order, granted the State's petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded this case for the immediate issuance of the warrants for which the State applied. View "Alabama v. Greenetrack, Inc. " on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, the Kentucky Department of Revenue, and eight horse Kentucky racing associations that wished to expand their businesses to include wagering upon historical horse racing. Appellants filed an action for a declaration of rights concerning the operation of mechanical and electronic devices for wagering on previously run horse races, so-called “historical horse racing.” The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which held (1) the Commission has the statutory authority to license and regulate the operation of pari-mutuel wagering on historic horse racing; (2) under the present statutory scheme, the Department does not have the authority to tax the wagering upon historical horse races; and (3) whether the licensed operation of wagering on historic horse racing violates the gambling provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code is an issue that depends upon facts not in the record, therefore requiring further proceedings in the circuit court. View "Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Family Trust Found. of Ky." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Revenue assessed taxes, penalties, and interest against Isle of Capri Casino, Inc. and its affiliated entities for tax years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. The Department based the assessment on the application of the license fees as a credit, claiming that only the tax liability of four Isle of Capri entities that actually held the licenses were eligible for offset, and could not benefit the affiliated group as a whole. Isle of Capri appealed the Department's assessment first to the Board of Review and then to the Board of Tax Appeals; both affirmed the assessment with minor changes. Isle of Capri appealed again, and the chancery court granted summary judgment in its favor. The Department subsequently appealed. Finding no error in the chancery court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. Isle of Capri Casino, Inc." on Justia Law

The Tribe bought land from the City of Lansing to build a class III gaming facility, using funds appropriated by Congress for the benefit of certain Michigan tribes. The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act provides that land acquired with the income on these funds shall be held in trust by the federal government. Michigan obtained an injunction to prevent the Tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the submission would violate a compact between the state and the Tribe. That compact requires that a tribe seeking to have land taken into trust for gaming purposes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B), secure a revenue-sharing agreement with other tribes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state did not seek to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, so IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the property at issue will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe. View "Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe" on Justia Law