Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Mount Airy #1, LLC operated a hotel and casino located in Mount Pocono. Mount Airy challenged the constitutionality of Section 1403(c) of the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act. That section levied a “local share assessment” against all licensed casinos’ gross slot machine revenue. According to Mount Airy, the statutory provision violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it imposed grossly unequal local share assessments upon similarly situated slot machine licensees. After review of the parties' arguments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the local share assessment was a non-uniform tax of the sort prohibited by Article 8, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, the Court severed Subsections 1403(c)(2) and (c)(3) from the Gaming Act. View "Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dept. of Revenue, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied to the State Harness Racing Commission to renew his driver/trainer license for horse harness racing in Maine. The Commission denied the application because Plaintiff had previously been denied a license by a racing authority in New York. The Commission based its conclusion that the reciprocal disciplinary action provision of the harness racing licensing statute prohibited the issuance of the Maine license even though New York had subsequently rescinded its license denial. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the statute. View "Mosher v. State Harness Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed challenges by petitioners SugarHouse HSP Gaming, LP (“SugarHouse”), then-present holder of a Category 2 slot machine license and operator of the Sugar House Casino in the City of Philadelphia, and Market East Associates (“Market East”), an unsuccessful applicant for that license. SugarHouse and Market East challenged the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board's (“Board”) grant of the last remaining Category 2 slot machine license for the City of Philadelphia to Stadium Casino, LLC (“Stadium”). Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court determined additional information was required on the issue of whether Stadium was ineligible to apply for a Category 2 license. The Board was affirmed in part and vacated in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, LP v. Pa. G.C.Bd." on Justia Law

The West Virginia Racing Commission suspended the occupational permits of each of seven jockeys for thirty days and imposed a $1,000 fine on each of the jockeys for certain rules governing horse racing. The circuit court reversed and vacated the Commission’s order, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the Commission’s factual findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fact that the circuit court’s review of the evidence resulted in the circuit court reaching an alternative conclusion based on substantial evidence was not a valid reason to reverse the Commission’s findings; and (2) the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. View "W. Va. Racing Comm’n v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Tribe) petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 (S.B. 1011) as law. On March 30, 2015, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed S.B. 1011 with supermajorities. S.B. 1011 had one purpose: to repeal Idaho Code section 54-2512A, a law which allowed wagering on “historical” horse races. The Tribe alleged that the Governor did not return his veto for S.B. 1011 within the five-day deadline under the Idaho Constitution. The Tribe argued that because the veto was untimely, the bill automatically became law and the Secretary of State had a non-discretionary duty to certify it as law. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the Writ. View "Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney" on Justia Law

The federally recognized Indian Tribe is a successor to an 1864 Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa Indians, including an agreement by the United States to set aside property in Isabella County, Michigan as a reservation. The Treaty did not mention application of federal regulations to members of the Tribe or to the Tribe itself. The property reserved for the “exclusive use, ownership, and occupancy” of the Tribe became the Isabella Reservation. The Tribe has over 3,000 members, and is governed by an elected council. In 1993, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Tribe and the state entered a compact, approved by the United States, allowing the Tribe to conduct gaming on the Isabella reservation. The Tribe opened the Casino; enacted a gaming code with licensing criteria for employees; and created a regulatory body. The council hires all Casino management-level employees, approves contracts, and decides how to distribute revenue. Of the Casino’s 3,000 employees, 7% are Tribe members, as are 30% of management-level employees. The Casino generates $250 million in gross annual revenues and attracts 20,000 customers per year, many of whom are not Tribe members. The Tribe discharged Lewis for violating an employee handbook policy that prohibited solicitation by employees, including solicitation related to union activities, on Casino property. The NLRB found that the policy violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and enforced the order, finding that the NLRB has jurisdiction over the Casino’s employment practices. View "Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC (SSR) applied for a license to place a casino in certain areas of Massachusetts. Caesars Entertainment Corporation and three Massachusetts affiliates (collectively, Caesars) were the proposed operators of the casino. The Massachusetts Gaming Commission issued an investigatory report concluding that Caesars was unsuitable as an operator, which caused Caesars to accede to SSR’s request that it withdraw from their contractual relationship. Caesars brought this action under 28 U.S.C. 1983 against certain Commission officials in their individual and official capacities and also brought a state law claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as beyond the scope of federal affordable relief and dismissed the state law claim as standing alone. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Caesars alleged no cognizable protected property interest, its Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (2) Caesars’ class-of-one Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim could not be recognized against a state actor given the breadth of discretion provided by the Massachusetts casino licensing statute. View "Caesars Mass. Dev. Co., LLC v. Crosby" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of a rule promulgated by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Respondent) mandating out-of-competition race horse drug testing. Petitioners commenced this hybrid article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding, alleging that the rule, referred to as the Out of Competition Testing Rule (OCTR) was not authorized by Respondent’s enabling legislation. Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that Respondent had acted in excess of its legislatively delegated power. The Appellate Division modified by effectively denying the petition, concluding that the OCTR was, for the most part, valid and that the rule’s promulgation lay within Respondent’s legislatively conferred authority to regulate and supervise race meets at which pari-mutuel wagering is permitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent possesses the power to promulgate rules mandating warrantless, out-of-competition equine testing for proscribed doping agents. View "Ford v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Bd." on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief. View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law

In 2009, intervenor-requestor James Schneller of Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against Gambling, sent an email to Catherine Stetler, a press aide in the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“GCB”), requesting copies of communications between the GCB and several applicants for gaming licenses, as well as copies of the financial data that each applicant provided to the GCB. He also asked for permission to speak at the GCB’s next public hearing, and copied his request to the GCB’s Director of Media Relations and Chief Enforcement Counsel. It was undisputed that requestor did not make mention of any open-records officer in his written request. The press aide responded to the written request by return email, wherein she apologized for having been out of the office and attached a public comment sign-up form with instructions to return the completed form for permission to comment at the GCB’s public hearing on the following day. The aide did not otherwise respond to the request for records, and did not forward the request to the GCB’s open-records officer. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the requirements for written Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) requests for access to public records, the proper application of the provision which directs that all such requests “must be addressed to the open-records officer.” The Court held that in order to establish a valid RTKL request sufficient to trigger appellate rights from a nonresponse under the RTKL, the requestor must address his request to the respective open-records officer as mandated in Section 703. View "PA Gaming Control Brd. v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law