Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Appellee Greenwood Gaming & Entertainment Inc. (“Greenwood”) operated Parx Casino (“Parx”), located in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. During 2014, as part of its efforts to encourage slot machine and table game play, Greenwood distributed to patrons of Parx who played its slot machines and table games various “promotions, giveaways and direct player development:” items given away included cash, department store gift cards, and items of personal property. Parx also gave away tickets to attend live concerts and entertainment performances. In 2016, Greenwood filed a petition for refund with the Board of Appeals of the Department of Revenue (“Board of Appeals”) for the calendar year 2014, contending that it was entitled under Section 1103 of the Pennsylvania Gaming Act to exclude from the taxable revenue attributable to its table games and slot machines the value of all cash and personal property it distributed to the players of those games. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that concert tickets were not services within the meaning of Section 1103, and so were excludible from these taxable revenues. View "Greenwood Gaming v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two American Indian tribes, business entities affiliated with the tribes, and individual tribe members, sued a number of non-tribal cardrooms alleging they were offering banked card games on non-tribal land, in violation of the exclusive right of Indian tribes to offer such games. Based on those allegations, plaintiffs asserted claims for public nuisance, unfair competition, declaratory and injunctive relief, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship and prospective economic advantage. The defendants demurred and, after two rounds of amendments to the complaint, the trial court sustained the third and final demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment of dismissal. The court ruled that, as governmental entities, the Indian tribes and their affiliated business entities were not “persons” with standing to sue under the unfair competition law (UCL), and were not “private person[s]” with standing under the public nuisance statutes. The court further ruled the business entities and the individual tribe members failed to plead sufficient injury to themselves to establish standing to sue under the UCL or the public nuisance statutes. Although plaintiffs broadly framed the issue on appeal as whether they, as American Indians, had standing to redress their grievances in California state courts, the Court of Appeal determined it was much narrower: whether the complaint in this case adequately plead the asserted claims and contained allegations sufficient to establish the threshold issue of whether any of the named plaintiffs had standing to bring those claims. The Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the complaint did not do so and, therefore, affirmed judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians etc. v. Flynt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order finding that both Rule 2.13(b)(5) of the Casino Gaming Rules and Ark. Code Ann. 27-117-101(b) are unconstitutional, holding that the circuit court erred.In 2019, the Arkansas Racing Commission (ARC) adopted Rule 2.13(5)(b) (the Rule) of the ARC-Casino Gaming Rules, which provides that letters of support must be from the county judge, quorum court, or mayor holding office at the time of the submission of an application for a casino license. The General Assembly subsequently passed Act 371 of 2019 (the Act), which was identical to Rule 2.13(5)(b) and is codified at Ark. Code Ann. 23-117-101. Appellant applied for a casino license in May 2019, but the application was denied. Appellant filed the underling litigation challenging the denial of a license and the constitutionality of the Act. The circuit court declared that Rule and the Act were unconstitutional because they imposed an additional qualification to Arkansas Constitutional Amendment 100. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Rule is consistent with Amendment 100 and does not impose an additional requirement; and (2) the Act is consistent with Amendment 100 and does not impose an additional requirement. View "Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court reversing decision the judgment of trial court and directing summary judgment for the Town of Ledyard, holding that the ambit of Conn. Gen. Stat. 12-161a includes a directly related federal action that is determinative of a municipality's authority to pursue the underlying state collection proceeding.The Town brought a complaint to collect unpaid taxes for gaming equipment leased by WMS Gaming, Inc. to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, for its gaming operations. The Tribal Nation responded by filing a second action in the federal court challenging the Town's authority to impose the taxes. The parties eventually executed a stipulation and motions for summary judgment as to liability only with respect to the federal action attorney's fees. The trial court concluded that the Town was liable for the federal action attorney fees pursuant to section 12-161a. The appellate court reversed, construing section 12-161a to conclude that the Town's liability for attorney's fees under the statute was limited to the collection proceeding in state court and did not include the related federal court proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that WMS Gaming was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees within the meaning of section 12-161a. View "Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc." on Justia Law

The Nation and some of its officials filed suit against the Village of Union Springs and certain of its officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) preempts the Village's ordinance regulating gambling as applied to the Nation's operation of a bingo parlor on a parcel of land located within both the Village and the Nation's federal reservation, and for corresponding injunctive relief.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Nation, agreeing with the district court that neither issue nor claim preclusion bars this suit and that IGRA preempts contrary Village law because the parcel of land at issue sits on "Indian lands" within the meaning of that Act. View "Cayuga Nation v. Tanner" on Justia Law

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2719, allows a federally recognized Indian tribe to conduct gaming on lands taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior as of October 17, 1988 and permits gaming on lands that are thereafter taken into trust for an Indian tribe that is restored to federal recognition where the tribe establishes a significant historical connection to the particular land. Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians regained its federal recognition in 1991 and requested an opinion on whether a Vallejo parcel would be eligible for tribal gaming. Yocha Dehe, a federally recognized tribe, objected. The Interior Department concluded that Scotts Valley failed to demonstrate the requisite “significant historical connection to the land.” Scotts Valley challenged the decision.Yocha Dehe moved to intervene to defend the decision alongside the government, explaining its interest in preventing Scotts Valley from developing a casino in the Bay Area, which would compete with Yocha Dehe’s gaming facility, and that the site Scotts Valley seeks to develop "holds cultural resources affiliated with [Yocha Dehe’s] Patwin ancestors.”The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Yocha Dehe’s motion, citing lack of standing. Injuries from a potential future competitor are neither “imminent” nor “certainly impending.” There was an insufficient causal link between the alleged threatened injuries and the challenged agency action, given other steps required before Scotts Valley could operate a casino. Resolution of the case would not “as a practical matter impair or impede” the Tribe’s ability to protect its interests. View "Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

In this proposed class action suit challenging the rules of blackjack at the Encore Boston Harbor Casino the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court judge granting the motion to dismiss brought by MGM Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC (MGM), holding that the rules authorized MGM to offer 6:5 payout blackjack.The Encore Boston Harbor Casino was operated by Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, Wynn MA, LLC, and Wynn Resorts, Ltd. (Encore). Plaintiffs, the gamblers challenging the rules of the game, sued Encore and MGM, contending that there were entitled to three dollars for every two dollars bet (3:2) instead of the six dollars for every five dollars bet (6:5) that they received when playing at tables requiring smaller bets. Plaintiffs argued that the Massachusetts Gaming Commission's blackjack rules did not clearly authorize payouts of 6:5 except with games played by dealing rules different from those used at Plaintiffs' tables. The superior court allowed MGM's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs understood the rules and the stakes and that deference was due to the Commission's interpretation of its blackjack rules. View "DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp Redevelopment, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part and order entered by the superior court entering final judgment in favor of Defendants in this litigation to enjoin enforcement measures stemming from the belief that a Rewards Program encompassed within the operation of Crazie Overstock LLC's enterprise was unlawful, holding that the Rewards Program constituted an unlawful sweepstakes in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4.Crazie Overstock brought this action to enjoin enforcement measures taken by the State and certain members of the State's Alcohol and Law Enforcement Division. The enforcement measures were taken on the grounds that the Rewards Program was unlawful. The superior court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Crazie Overstock Rewards Program may violate N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-306.4 and other North Carolina gambling provisions. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for Defendants with respect to the issue of whether the Rewards Program violated section 14-306.4 but reversed and remanded as to the issue of whether the program violated section 14-306.1A. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the Rewards Program constituted an unlawful sweepstakes in violation of section 14-306.4, and remand was unnecessary. View "Crazie Overstock Promotions, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the DOI, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, federal officials, and the Spokane Tribe of Indians, in an action brought by the Kalispel Tribe of Indians, challenging the Secretary of DOI's decision determining that the Spokane Tribe of Indians' proposed gaming establishment on newly acquired off-reservation land would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. Kalispel raised challenges pursuant to the the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.The panel held that IGRA requires the Secretary to weigh and consider the various interests of those within the surrounding community when deciding whether additional off-reservation gaming would be detrimental to the surrounding community. A showing that additional gaming may be detrimental to some members of the surrounding community, including an Indian tribe, does not dictate the outcome of the Secretary's two-step determination. The panel agreed with the DC Circuit and rejected Kalispel's argument that any detriment to Kalispel precluded the Secretary from issuing a favorable two-part determination. Rather, the panel concluded that the Secretary had the authority to issue a two-step determination, and the Secretary's decision to issue a favorable decision here was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The panel declined to reach the merits of Kalispel's contention, which was not advanced in the district court, that the Secretary previously announced a policy that additional off-reservation gaming would not be approved if a nearby Indian tribe could show that additional gaming would be detrimental to it. Finally, the panel concluded that Kalispel has not shown that the Secretary failed to consider its claimed harms or to comply with the relevant statutes and regulations, and thus it has not shown that the Secretary violated the federal government's trust duty owed to Kalispel. View "Kalispel Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama appealed a circuit court order that dismissed the State's claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief "to abate a public nuisance of unlawful gambling," pursuant to section 6-5-120, Ala. Code 1975, against some, but not all, of the defendants. The circuit court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. However, we determine that the order was not appropriate for Rule 54(b) certification; therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Alabama v. Epic Tech, Inc., et al." on Justia Law