Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy or both, and other federal crimes, incident to years of participation in a criminal organization responsible for a large illegal gambling operation. The charged conduct involved sports betting, "football cards," and video poker that spawned criminal support activities such as money laundering, usurious lending, and extortionate collection of credit. The three male defendants also sought to burn down a business. Before trial, defendants jointly moved to suppress evidence obtained through a series of wiretaps. The district court denied the motion. All defendants were convicted of nearly all of the charges, and were sentenced to terms of 271 months, 216 months, 183 months, and (the female) 21 months. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting various challenges, including challenges to the wiretaps, and stating that there was no chance that innocent defendants were convicted. View "United States v. Albertelli" on Justia Law

Cancun Cyber Cafe and Business Center was an internet cafe and business center that operated a sweepstakes promotion whereby Cancun's customers could play casino-style video games to learn whether they had won prizes through the sweepstakes promotion. Cancun filed a complaint for emergency declaratory and injunctive relief and a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against the city, police chief, and county prosecuting attorney, seeking declarations that, inter alia, Cancun's business and sweepstakes promotion was lawful. The county attorney filed a motion to dismiss Cancun's complaint. The circuit court granted the motion and denied as moot Cancun's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was no existing legal controversy in this case, Cancun was not entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting the prosecuting attorney's motion to dismiss and denying as moot Cancun's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction. View "Cancun Cyber Cafe & Bus. Ctr., Inc. v. City of N. Little Rock" on Justia Law

In 1986, the Association signed an agreement with Beulah Park governing racing operations; later, they amended to establish a regular process in which the Association periodically would grant or withhold consent to simulcast races to betting facilities outside of Ohio. In 1996, the Association executed a similar agreement with River Downs. Under the agreements, when Beulah Park and River Downs want to simulcast races to out-of-state betting facilities, they send a letter to the Association outlining the terms of the proposed simulcast and requesting authorization. After the Association withheld consent to 2006 requests, Beulah Park and River Downs filed a complaint with the Ohio Racing Commission. The Racing Commission ruled in favor of the race parks. The Association sued, arguing that the federal Interstate Horseracing Act, 15 U.S.C. 3004(a) preempted the Ohio law. The district court agreed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that "To respect the state law is to slight the federal one." View "Horseman's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. DeWine" on Justia Law

ZDI Gaming, Inc. distributes certain gaming machines that allow players to play what amounts to "slot machines" using "cash cards" to place their bets. The version of the machine that gave rise to this case allows the machine to credit-back a player's winnings onto the card. The State Gambling Commission ultimately denied further distribution of the machines, finding that the machines "extended credit and allowed gambling without prepayment by 'cash, check or electronic point-of-sale bank transfer'" violating then-operative regulations. ZDI appealed the Gambling Commission's ruling to the Pierce County superior court; the State responded that it believed RCW 9.46.095 granted exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to the Thurston County superior court, and suggested that ZDI withdraw its petition from Pierce and refile at Thurston County. ZDI declined and the State moved to dismiss. Noting that sometimes "when the Legislature uses the word 'jurisdiction,' it really mean[s] 'venue,'" [the Pierce County court] denied the State’s motion to dismiss, but transferred the case to the Thurston County superior court. The Thurston County court reversed the Gambling Commission, finding that the cash cards were the equivalent to both cash and merchandise and therefore lawful under state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Pierce County had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and that substantial evidence did not support the Gambling Commission's determination that the cards did not meet the statutory definition of "cash." The court then remanded the case to Thurston County. The Supreme Court surmised that "this case was filed in a county other than where it was to be adjudicated," and asked whether "as a consequence, the case [would] not be heard." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "the proper forum was a question of venue and not subject matter jurisdiction of the superior courts," but otherwise affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2007, the house of delegates enacted legislation that proposed a constitutional amendment that would legalize video slot machine gambling in Maryland. During that same session, the state senate initiated companion legislation, an appropriations bill, contingent on the proposed constitutional amendment being ratified by the electorate, pursuant to which the gambling revenue would be appropriated and distributed. Each piece of legislation was passed by the general assembly and signed into law by the governor. Petitioners mounted an attack on both the contingent legislation and the constitutional amendment, arguing (1) the contingent legislation unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the voters, and (2) the ballot question language regarding the constitutional amendment was misleading and deficient. The Supreme Court addressed the first of Petitioners' contentions in Smigiel v. Franchot, in which it held that the legislation was constitutional. In this case, the Court (1) affirmed its holding in Smigiel; and (2) held that, regarding Petitioners' second contention, the ballot question language was sufficient, as it accurately conveyed the effect of the proposed amendment, and was neither misleading nor deficient. View "Stop Slots MD v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

This appeal focused on the legality of a video gaming device known as Bankshot, which was developed and distributed by Appellees. Appellees filed this lawsuit after the State seized two Bankshot devices as alleged illegal gambling devices, seeking a declaration that they were not illegal. The state agencies and officers who were named as defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that Bankshot was a "game of chance" and therefore an unlawful gambling device. The district court (1) found that Bankshot was a game of chance when played in some modes but not when played by others; (2) ultimately concluded that Bankshot was a gambling device under Nebraska law; and (3) refused the State's request for injunctive relief, reasoning that there was no showing that Appellees knowingly used Bankshot to advance unlawful gaming activity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying injunctive relief because (1) where the Bankshot game was reconfigured to comply with the terms of the district court order, injunctive relief completely banning the development and distribution of Bankshot in any form was not warranted; and (2) Bankshot, as currently configured, was not a game of chance. View "Am. Amusements Co. v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant Willard Farr owned seven gaming machines seized from a Union business. The magistrate issued an order to destroy the machines, and Appellant timely sought a post-seizure hearing in an attempt to block their destruction. Following the hearing, the magistrate affirmed the order, and Appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented before the magistrate concerning the State's witness and her inability to identify which of the offending machines she played. Finding that Appellant misunderstood the burden of proof at the post-seizure hearing (which rested solely on the owner to show why the machines should not have been forfeited and destroyed), the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's and circuit court's decisions. View "Union County Sheriff's Office v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC (KPG), a limited liability corporation formed by Penn National Gaming, Inc. (Penn National), entered into a real estate sale contract with HV Properties of Kansas, LLC (HV), pursuant to which KPG purchased from HV parcels of land in southeast Kansas for $2.5 million for the purpose of seeking to develop a lottery gaming facility on the land. KPG ultimately chose not to develop a lottery gaming facility on the land. HV thus did not receive $37.5 million of payments that it had hoped to receive from KPG under the contract. KPG filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not breach the terms of the contract. HV filed a counterclaim alleging that KPG breached the terms of the contract. HV also filed a separate action against Penn National alleging breach of Penn National’s obligation as guarantor to make the payments due under the contract between KPG and HV. The district court consolidated the two cases and granted summary judgment in favor of KPG and Penn National. Following the entry of judgment, the district court awarded attorneys' fees and expenses to KPG and Penn National. HV appealed these rulings. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. HV Properties of Kansas, LLC" on Justia Law

Wild Rose Entertainment and Signature Management Group (SMG) entered into an agreement that delineated the parties' relationship with regard to future state casino projects. After Wild Rose was awarded a gaming license to develop a casino in Emmetsburg, it terminated the agreement. SMG sued Wild Rose for breach of contract, and a jury found Wild Rose breached the agreement. During the Emmetsburg action, Wild Rose was awarded a gaming license to develop a casino in Clinton. SMG then filed a separate action against Wild Rose, alleging that it breached paragraph 5A of the agreement by failing to negotiate in good faith with SMG for the management of the Clinton casino. Paragraph 5A was litigated in the Emmetsburg action. The district court granted summary judgment for Wild Rose, concluding the doctrine of claim preclusion barred SMG's current claim. The court of appeals affirmed after finding Wild Rose repudiated the entire agreement, which required SMG to seek damages for all remaining rights of performance under the contract in the first lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Wild Rose repudiated the agreement, and (2) the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the action. View "Pavone v. Kirke" on Justia Law

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.View "Amador County, California v. Kenneth Salazar, et al" on Justia Law