Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

The State filed an in personam action pursuant to OCGA 16-14-6 (b) of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against Hargurtag Singh and his company Rajan Singh, LLC (collectively, "Singh"), seeking equitable relief including injunctive relief to stop the alienation of Singh's property and the appointment of a receiver over Singh's business and property. The complaint also sought the forfeiture of certain property as defendants in rem pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7. The complaint alleged that Singh was engaging in illegal gambling activity at its Clayton County business, Pure Gas Station, by paying out cash winnings to persons who played electronic gaming devices located in the store. On the same day the action was brought, the trial court granted the State's request that cash and equipment be seized and that certain assets be frozen; granted the State's request for a temporary restraining order; and granted the State's request that a receiver be placed in control of the business. The State and Singh subsequently entered into a consent agreement whereby Singh was allowed to resume operating the business under certain conditions and under the receiver's supervision. Hargurtag Singh later moved to dismiss the action on two grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, and (2) that the State's in personam forfeiture claims were unconstitutional. The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the State had sufficiently alleged violations of OCGA 16-12-22 and 16-12-28. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in, inter alia, "Cisco v. Georgia," (680 SE2d 831) (2009)) the trial court dismissed the State’s in personam claims because it determined that all civil in personam claims under the RICO statute were unconstitutional. The State appealed and Singh filed a cross appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Singh moved to dismiss contending that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction based on its view that the State failed to file an application for interlocutory review; the State contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the in personam defendant on grounds that claims under Georgia's RICO act were unconstitutional; and in the cross appeal, Singh contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Court reversed the decision pertaining to the in personam defendants, finding none of the subsections of OCGA 16-14-6 require proof of criminal conduct on the part of the in personam defendants, but allowed the superior court to enjoin any violations of OCGA 16-14-4 until the case was resolved; and, (3) Singh failed to show that there was no set of provable facts that would entitle the State to relief. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6) was sustained. View "Georgia v. Singh" on Justia Law

Mason-Dixon Resorts, L.P. made a direct appeal to the Supreme Court to challenge a Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board decision that awarded a Category Slot Machine 3 slot machine license to intervenor Woodlands Fayette, L.L.C. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]e have no doubt that there may have been other applicants for this remaining Category 3 license, including appellant, whose facilities may not have been appropriate for the award of a license. Our task, however, is not to determine for ourselves which of the facilities was the best one, but instead to pass upon the specific claims raised, under the standard review established by the Act. . . . finding no error warranting relief, we affirm the Board's Order." View "Mason-Dixon Resorts v. PA Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act allows “Class III gaming activities” (casino gaming) on Indian lands (25 U.S.C. 2710(d)) if the tribe adopts a gaming ordinance approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission and negotiates a “Tribal-State compact.” Bay Mills is a recognized tribe with a reservation in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. In 1993, the tribe entered a compact with Michigan. The Gaming Commission approved its gaming ordinance. Bay Mills began operating a casino on its reservation in Chippewa County. In 1997, Congress passed the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, which directed Bay Mills to deposit a portion of its settlement funds into a land trust, with earnings to be used for improvements on or acquisition of tribal land; land so acquired “shall be held as Indian lands.” In 2010, Bay Mills used trust earnings to purchase 40 acres in Vanderbilt, more than 100 miles from its reservation, then constructed a small casino on the property (38 electronic machines, expanded to 84). Michigan and another tribe sued, claiming violations of the compact and state law. The district court enjoined Bay Mills from operating the Vanderbilt casino. The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. The district court lacked jurisdiction over some claims and tribal sovereign immunity bars others. View "State of MI v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty" on Justia Law

Antico was convicted of participating in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 23 1962(c), and illegal gambling, 18 U.S.C. 1955, and sentenced to 108 months in prison. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the racketeering conviction the sentence. The district court acted within its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury, based on Antico’s history of jury tampering and other factors. The court took reasonable measures to avoid prejudice, including a neutral explanation to the jurors. View "United States v. Pica " on Justia Law

Ondricko had been working in the gaming industry since 1994 and began working for MGM in 2003. MGM promoted Ondricko to floor supervisor in 2005. As a floor supervisor, she was responsible for supervising dealers at as many as six gaming tables in an area referred to as a “pit.” MGM claims it fired Ondricko because she participated in a “bad shuffle” at a blackjack table she was supervising. At least six other supervisors had engaged in misconduct related to shuffle procedures. Only two were terminated. She sued for race and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.37.2101. The district court found that Ondricko admitted the employment misconduct that resulted in her termination and that she had not shown disparate treatment of similarly situated comparators. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the misconduct was insufficient to justify termination and that Ondricko had established disparate treatment of male comparators. View "Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC" on Justia Law

The federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721, establishes a cooperative federal-state-tribal regime for regulating gaming by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands. The Massachusetts Gaming Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K, sect. 3(a), establishes a licensing scheme and other standards for gaming. KG, a potential applicant for a gaming license, argued that the state Act provides unauthorized preferences to Indian tribes and on that basis treats the southeast section of the state differently, and this constitutes a classification on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and is inconsistent with congressional intent in the federal Indian gaming statute. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated with respect to the equal protection claim and otherwise affirmed. Whether the tribal provisions are "authorized" by the IGRA such that is subject to only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in this suit. There is apparently no judicial authority addressing the question of whether a state may negotiate a tribal-state compact with a federally recognized tribe that does not presently possess Indian lands. View "KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick" on Justia Law

These four adversary proceedings involved suits by Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees against the Lower Sioux Indian Community (the Tribe) and its subsidiary, Dakota Finance Corporation (together, Defendants). In three of the adversaries, the trustees pursued the Tribe and the debtors for turnover of ongoing tribal revenue payments owed to the debtors under the Tribe's ordinances and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In one of the adversaries, the trustee was seeking to avoid a lien asserted by Dakota Finance Corporation on the ongoing revenue payments owed to one debtor as being unperfected. Absent the filing of a bankruptcy case, the creditors of these debtors would be prohibited by the Tribe's sovereign immunity from, for example, garnishing those revenues. The issue here was whether the filing of bankruptcy by Tribe members serves to make the debtors' ongoing revenues from the tribe available to the respective trustees for the benefit of their creditors. The bankruptcy court held that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and dismissed the adversaries as to those parties. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and were, therefore, immune from these suits against them. View "Bucher v. Dakota Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

These four adversary proceedings involved suits by Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees against the Lower Sioux Indian Community (the Tribe) and its subsidiary, Dakota Finance Corporation (together, Defendants). In three of the adversaries, the trustees pursued the Tribe and the debtors for turnover of ongoing tribal revenue payments owed to the debtors under the Tribe's ordinances and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In one of the adversaries, the trustee was seeking to avoid a lien asserted by Dakota Finance Corporation on the ongoing revenue payments owed to one debtor as being unperfected. Absent the filing of a bankruptcy case, the creditors of these debtors would be prohibited by the Tribe's sovereign immunity from, for example, garnishing those revenues. At issue here was whether the filing of bankruptcy by Tribe members serves to make the debtors' ongoing revenues from the tribe available to the respective trustees for the benefit of their creditors. The bankruptcy court held that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and dismissed the adversaries as to those parties. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and were, therefore, immune from these suits against them. View "Bucher v. Dakota Fin. Corp." on Justia Law

These four adversary proceedings involved suits by Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees against the Lower Sioux Indian Community (the Tribe) and its subsidiary, Dakota Finance Corporation (together, Defendants). In three of the adversaries, the trustees pursued the Tribe and the debtors for turnover of ongoing tribal revenue payments owed to the debtors under the Tribe's ordinances and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In one of the adversaries, the trustee was seeking to avoid a lien asserted by Dakota Finance Corporation on the ongoing revenue payments owed to one debtor as being unperfected. Absent the filing of a bankruptcy case, the creditors of these debtors would be prohibited by the Tribe's sovereign immunity from, for example, garnishing those revenues. The issue here was whether the filing of bankruptcy by Tribe members serves to make the debtors' ongoing revenues from the tribe available to the respective trustees for the benefit of their creditors. The bankruptcy court held that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and dismissed the adversaries as to those parties. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and were, therefore, immune from these suits against them. View "Dietz v. Lower Sioux Indian Cmty." on Justia Law

These four adversary proceedings involved suits by Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustees against the Lower Sioux Indian Community (the Tribe) and its subsidiary, Dakota Finance Corporation (together, Defendants). In three of the adversaries, the trustees pursued the Tribe and the debtors for turnover of ongoing tribal revenue payments owed to the debtors under the Tribe's ordinances and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. In one of the adversaries, the trustee was seeking to avoid a lien asserted by Dakota Finance Corporation on the ongoing revenue payments owed to one debtor as being unperfected. Absent the filing of a bankruptcy case, the creditors of these debtors would be prohibited by the Tribe's sovereign immunity from, for example, garnishing those revenues. The issue here was whether the filing of bankruptcy by Tribe members serves to make the debtors' ongoing revenues from the tribe available to the respective trustees for the benefit of their creditors. The bankruptcy court held that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and dismissed the adversaries as to those parties. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that Defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and were, therefore, immune from these suits against them. View "Bucher v. Dakota Fin. Corp." on Justia Law