Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved three establishments (collectively, Establishments) that ran promotional programs intended to attract patrons to their casinos. In essence, if the patrons joined an establishment’s club, they received coupons or credits called “free play” that allowed them to play slot machines without using any of their personal money. The Establishments sued the South Dakota Department of Revenue and Regulation requesting a declaration that free play was not part of adjusted gross proceeds and was therefore not subject to gaming tax. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Department, ruling that free play was not a deductible event in the calculation of adjusted gross revenue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant statutes and regulations do not include the value of free play for slot machines in the calculation of an establishment’s adjusted gross revenue, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that the Establishments must remit gaming tax for the value of free play. View "First Gold, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue and Regulation" on Justia Law

Fla. Stat. 550.054(14)(a), effective July 1, 2010, sets forth the standards a holder of a permit to conduct jai alai must meet to convert the permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai. Two businesses d applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits on the day section 550.054 became effective. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR) granted the applications. Thereafter, Appellees instituted a declaratory judgment alleging that section 550.054(14) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the two businesses and DBPR, concluding that the statute was a general law. The First District reversed, concluding that section 550.054(14)(a) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute is a valid general law. View "Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Houston County Economic Development Authority ("HEDA") appealed a judgment condemning 691 allegedly illegal gambling devices, $288,657.68 in cash, and various documents allegedly related to illegal gambling. The Office of the Alabama Attorney General executed a search warrant at a bingo gaming facility known as Center Stage Alabama ("Center Stage") located in Houston County. HEDA sought, and was granted, the right to intervene in the forfeiture action (HEDA operated Center Stage). The electronic-gaming devices used in the operation of Center Stage were leased by HEDA from each gaming device's respective manufacturer or developer. HEDA purportedly operated Center Stage under a "Class C Special Permit to Operate Bingo Games" granted by the Houston County Commission to operate charitable bingo games under Amendment No. 569 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901. In addition to offering electronic gaming and Roubingo, Center Stage also offered traditional "paper bingo," live entertainment, and a bar. The trial court concluded that the devices, including the electronic devices, computer servers, and Roubingo tables, constituted illegal gambling devices. The trial court further concluded that the United States currency and other seized "gambling paraphernalia" was being used in connection with an illegal gambling operation. The trial court ordered that "the gambling devices ... be destroyed or otherwise disposed of by the State of Alabama" and ordered the State to deposit the seized currency into the State's General Fund. The trial court denied HEDA's postjudgment motion, and HEDA timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Houston County Economic Development Authority v. Alabama" on Justia Law

This matter came before the Court of Appeal for a third time; this matter stemmed from the California Valley Miwok Tribe's dispute with the Gambling Control Commission over money collected and held as a "non-compact tribe" under the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF). The Commission began withholding the distribution of RSTF funds to the Tribe when it became aware of a dispute over the tribe's membership and leadership as evidenced by ongoing proceedings and litigation involving the BIA's relationship with the Tribe. In its last opinion, the Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to lift a stay and to allow the parties to file dispositive motions. The parties filed their motions, and the trial court resolved them, entering judgment in favor of the Commission on its motion for summary judgment, which the Tribe then appealed. Finding that the Commission was properly withholding RSTF funds because it could not identify an undisputed tribal representative to receive them, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's decision. View "CA Valley Miwok Tribe v. CA Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief. View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law

In 2009, intervenor-requestor James Schneller of Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against Gambling, sent an email to Catherine Stetler, a press aide in the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“GCB”), requesting copies of communications between the GCB and several applicants for gaming licenses, as well as copies of the financial data that each applicant provided to the GCB. He also asked for permission to speak at the GCB’s next public hearing, and copied his request to the GCB’s Director of Media Relations and Chief Enforcement Counsel. It was undisputed that requestor did not make mention of any open-records officer in his written request. The press aide responded to the written request by return email, wherein she apologized for having been out of the office and attached a public comment sign-up form with instructions to return the completed form for permission to comment at the GCB’s public hearing on the following day. The aide did not otherwise respond to the request for records, and did not forward the request to the GCB’s open-records officer. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the requirements for written Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) requests for access to public records, the proper application of the provision which directs that all such requests “must be addressed to the open-records officer.” The Court held that in order to establish a valid RTKL request sufficient to trigger appellate rights from a nonresponse under the RTKL, the requestor must address his request to the respective open-records officer as mandated in Section 703. View "PA Gaming Control Brd. v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Racing Commission promulgated two administrative rules, a rule establishing the burden of proof for ejections by a racing association and a rule allowing the Racing Commission to grant a stay of a permit holder’s ejection by a racing association pending review. The Racing Commission adopted the rules without legislative approval, concluding that the rules were merely procedural rather than legislative and thus did not require legislative approval. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC filed a petition seeking a writ of prohibition and declaratory judgment claiming that the rules had not been properly promulgated under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the Racing Decision, concluding that the rules were properly adopted without the need for legislative approval and that the Racing Commission possessed inherent authority to issue a stay of a racetrack’s ejection decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the two rules were properly enacted procedural rules that were within the authority of the Racing Commission. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

Stop the Casino 101 Coalition sought to invalidate a compact between the state and the Federated Indians of the Graton Rancheria authorizing the operation of a gaming casino on a 254-acre parcel in and adjacent to the City of Rohnert Park. The coalition claimed that because the state failed to explicitly cede to the Graton Tribe jurisdiction over the property, which was formerly held by private parties, federal law does not authorize the assumption of tribal jurisdiction over the property, so that the state’s entry into the compact violates the California constitutional provision authorizing such gaming compacts. The state countered that the coalition’s claim is essentially an attack on the validity of action taken by the federal government that cannot be challenged in these state court proceedings, and that in all events there has been no violation of either federal or state law. The appeals court affirmed dismissal of the challenge, citing federal approval of the plan under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701) and declining to “pass judgment on the contentious policy issues underlying the creation of Indian reservations for the purpose of constructing gaming casinos.”View "Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wynn Las Vegas, alleging claims of breach of contract and recoupment regarding gambling debts that plaintiff owed to Wynn. The district court dismissed based on plaintiff's failure to exhaust the claims before the Nevada Gaming Control Board. The court held, however, that plaintiff was not required to exhaust his claims before the Gaming Control Board because the markers that underlie his case are credit instruments under Nevada law. Because the markers are credit instruments, plaintiff's claims did not trigger the Gaming Control Board's exclusive jurisdiction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.361(2). Plaintiff's claims must be resolved in the same manner as any other dispute involving the enforceability of a negotiable instrument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Zoggolis v. Wynn Las Vegas" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Constitution generally prohibits the Legislature from authorizing games of chance but contains an exception for live horseracing under certain conditions. At issue in this case was L.R. 41CA, a resolution to amend Neb. Const. art. III, 24 by permitting wagering on “replayed” horseraces in addition to wagering on live horseraces and specifying how the Legislature must appropriate the proceeds from a tax placed on wagering for live and replayed horseraces. The Secretary of State granted the writ of mandamus sought by the relator in this case, holding (1) the separate-vote provision of Neb. Const. art. XVI, 1 requires the Legislature to present constitutional amendments to voters in a manner that allows them to vote separately on distinct and independent subjects; and (2) L.R. 41CA violates the separate-vote provision, and therefore, article XVI, section 1 bars its placement on the November 2014 general election ballot. View "State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale" on Justia Law