Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, intervenor-requestor James Schneller of Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against Gambling, sent an email to Catherine Stetler, a press aide in the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“GCB”), requesting copies of communications between the GCB and several applicants for gaming licenses, as well as copies of the financial data that each applicant provided to the GCB. He also asked for permission to speak at the GCB’s next public hearing, and copied his request to the GCB’s Director of Media Relations and Chief Enforcement Counsel. It was undisputed that requestor did not make mention of any open-records officer in his written request. The press aide responded to the written request by return email, wherein she apologized for having been out of the office and attached a public comment sign-up form with instructions to return the completed form for permission to comment at the GCB’s public hearing on the following day. The aide did not otherwise respond to the request for records, and did not forward the request to the GCB’s open-records officer. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the requirements for written Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) requests for access to public records, the proper application of the provision which directs that all such requests “must be addressed to the open-records officer.” The Court held that in order to establish a valid RTKL request sufficient to trigger appellate rights from a nonresponse under the RTKL, the requestor must address his request to the respective open-records officer as mandated in Section 703. View "PA Gaming Control Brd. v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Racing Commission promulgated two administrative rules, a rule establishing the burden of proof for ejections by a racing association and a rule allowing the Racing Commission to grant a stay of a permit holder’s ejection by a racing association pending review. The Racing Commission adopted the rules without legislative approval, concluding that the rules were merely procedural rather than legislative and thus did not require legislative approval. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC filed a petition seeking a writ of prohibition and declaratory judgment claiming that the rules had not been properly promulgated under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the Racing Decision, concluding that the rules were properly adopted without the need for legislative approval and that the Racing Commission possessed inherent authority to issue a stay of a racetrack’s ejection decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the two rules were properly enacted procedural rules that were within the authority of the Racing Commission. View "PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

Stop the Casino 101 Coalition sought to invalidate a compact between the state and the Federated Indians of the Graton Rancheria authorizing the operation of a gaming casino on a 254-acre parcel in and adjacent to the City of Rohnert Park. The coalition claimed that because the state failed to explicitly cede to the Graton Tribe jurisdiction over the property, which was formerly held by private parties, federal law does not authorize the assumption of tribal jurisdiction over the property, so that the state’s entry into the compact violates the California constitutional provision authorizing such gaming compacts. The state countered that the coalition’s claim is essentially an attack on the validity of action taken by the federal government that cannot be challenged in these state court proceedings, and that in all events there has been no violation of either federal or state law. The appeals court affirmed dismissal of the challenge, citing federal approval of the plan under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701) and declining to “pass judgment on the contentious policy issues underlying the creation of Indian reservations for the purpose of constructing gaming casinos.”View "Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wynn Las Vegas, alleging claims of breach of contract and recoupment regarding gambling debts that plaintiff owed to Wynn. The district court dismissed based on plaintiff's failure to exhaust the claims before the Nevada Gaming Control Board. The court held, however, that plaintiff was not required to exhaust his claims before the Gaming Control Board because the markers that underlie his case are credit instruments under Nevada law. Because the markers are credit instruments, plaintiff's claims did not trigger the Gaming Control Board's exclusive jurisdiction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.361(2). Plaintiff's claims must be resolved in the same manner as any other dispute involving the enforceability of a negotiable instrument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Zoggolis v. Wynn Las Vegas" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Constitution generally prohibits the Legislature from authorizing games of chance but contains an exception for live horseracing under certain conditions. At issue in this case was L.R. 41CA, a resolution to amend Neb. Const. art. III, 24 by permitting wagering on “replayed” horseraces in addition to wagering on live horseraces and specifying how the Legislature must appropriate the proceeds from a tax placed on wagering for live and replayed horseraces. The Secretary of State granted the writ of mandamus sought by the relator in this case, holding (1) the separate-vote provision of Neb. Const. art. XVI, 1 requires the Legislature to present constitutional amendments to voters in a manner that allows them to vote separately on distinct and independent subjects; and (2) L.R. 41CA violates the separate-vote provision, and therefore, article XVI, section 1 bars its placement on the November 2014 general election ballot. View "State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale" on Justia Law

Illinois legalized riverboat casino gambling in 1990. Since then, the state’s once‐thriving horseracing industry has declined. In 2006 and 2008, former Governor Blagojevich signed into law two bills that imposed a tax on in‐state casinos of 3% of their revenue and placed the funds into a trust for the benefit of the horseracing industry. Casinos filed suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964, alleging that defendants, members of the horseracing industry, bribed the governor. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the racetracks, finding sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that there was a pattern of racketeering activity; that a jury could find the existence of an enterprise‐in‐fact, consisting of Blagojevich, his associates, and others; sufficient evidence that the defendants bribed Blagojevich to secure his signature on the 2008 Act; but that the casinos could not show that the alleged bribes proximately caused their injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was enough to survive summary judgment on the claim that the governor agreed to sign the Act in exchange for a bribe. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ten Massachusetts voters, submitted for certification an initiative petition that sought to prohibit casino and slots gambling that had been made legal under the Expanded Gaming Act of 2011 and to abolish parimutuel wagering on simulcast greyhound races. The Attorney General declined to certify the petition for inclusion on the November Statewide election ballot, concluding that it did not meet the requirements set forth in article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Plaintiffs filed a complaint “for relief in the nature of mandamus” seeking an order compelling the Attorney General to certify the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the requested relief, holding that the Attorney General erred in declining the certify the initiative petition, as it satisfied the requirements of article 48. View "Abdow v. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

Effective July 1, 2009, the New Hampshire Legislature imposed a ten percent tax on gambling winnings (Gambling Winnings Tax). The Gambling Winnings Tax was repealed effective May 23, 2011. The repeal was not retroactive, meaning that the tax was assessed on gambling winnings between July 1, 2009, and May 22, 2011. Petitioner Leonard Willey was a New Hampshire resident who, for the three years preceding the filing of this action, derived almost all of his earned income from gambling. For the 2009 tax year, he owed no federal income tax because his gambling losses exceeded his winnings. Petitioner David Eby was not an original party to this action, but was added as a substitute party later in the case. He was a New Hampshire resident who, in May 2011, purchased a scratch ticket and won ten dollars on the ticket, and was required to pay one dollar under the Gambling Winnings Tax as a result. This class action was filed in 2010, by putative class representatives Dean Leighton and Leighton Family Enterprises, LLC and Willey. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the Gambling Winnings Tax was illegal and unconstitutional on its face, as applied to pre-enactment lottery winners receiving their winnings through annuities, and as applied to professional gamblers, as well as a refund of all such taxes collected or withheld. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State and dismissed petitioners' motion for summary judgment and remaining claims challenging the constitutionality of the state's tax on gambling winnings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: the Court disagreed with petitioners that a tax on gross gambling winnings was inherently “unfair, unreasonable, and disproportional” under the New Hampshire constitution. Because petitioners could not show that they suffered harm under the Commerce Clause, were professional gamblers, or were gambling winnings annuity recipients, they did not suffer the same injury as the members of the subclasses they claimed to represent, and thus they did not demonstrate their entitlement to act as class representatives for the members of those subclasses. The Gambling Winnings Tax neither lacked uniformity nor was disproportional and unreasonable; and petitioners lacked standing to bring their remaining challenges to the tax. View "Eby v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment appealed the Commonwealth Court's en banc decision overruling exceptions and affirming a panel decision of that court, which likewise affirmed the order of the Board of Finance and Review regarding calculation of a slot machine tax. Greenwood petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse the decision and hold that the relevant section of the Gaming Act (4 Pa.C.S. sections 1101-1904) allowed for the cost of promotional awards given away by the gaming facility to be subtracted prior to calculation of the "gross terminal revenue" for purposes of slot machine taxes. Upon review of the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings: "to be deductible, the promotional awards must result from playing slot machines, and Greenwood is obligated to prove as much. After review of the Stipulation, we conclude that questions of fact remain concerning whether the specific awards claimed are a 'result of playing a slot machine.'" View "Greenwood Gaming v. PA Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law