Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

In 1991, the Tulalip Tribes of Washington and the State of Washington signed a tribal-state gaming compact (the Tulalip Compact), which has since been amended numerous times. The Spokane Tribe did not participate in the collective negotiation process that led to the Tulalip Compact. In 2007, a compact between the Spokane Tribe and the State (the Spokane Compact) became effective. In 2010, Tulalip requested negotiations with the State to amend its compact to enable Tulalip to acquire additional licenses to video player terminals licenses to video player terminals for Class III gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. When negotiations broke down, Tulalip initiated suit, asserting that the “most-favored tribe” clause in the Tulalip Compact entitled it to the amendment because the mechanism was available to the Spokane Tribe but unavailable to Tulalip. The district court granted summary judgment to the State and denied Tulalip’s cross-motion for summary judgment. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the most-favored tribe clause did not require the State to adopt Tulalip’s proposed amendment because the amendment did not mirror the restrictions set forth the Spokane compact. View "Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. State of Washington" on Justia Law

Based on investigations by law enforcement officials, a grand jury returned an indictment against several individuals and companies alleging that they had used an Internet gambling system to conceal illegal gambling by presenting it as an Internet sweepstakes. The prosecuting attorney then mailed letters to Plaintiff and other proprietors of Internet sweepstakes cafes threatening criminal prosecution if they did not immediately cease to run the sweepstakes. Plaintiff filed this action seeking to prohibit the prosecuting attorney from enforcing gambling laws against it with respect to Internet sweepstakes. Plaintiff sought to compel discovery of information related to the ongoing criminal investigation. The trial court ordered the prosecuting attorney to produce the information. The prosecuting attorney filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals balanced the competing interests of Plaintiff and the prosecuting attorney and affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that certain information being sought was not protected by the law enforcement investigatory privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law enforcement investigatory privilege is not absolute; and (2) the balancing test the Court adopted in Henneman v. Toledo for weighing the interests of law enforcement in keeping the information confidential against the needs of a civil litigant who requests the information in discovery remains valid. View "J & C Marketing, LLC v. McGinty" on Justia Law

The Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) filed a complaint against the State seeking a declaration that the Casino Act must be invalidated because it is unconstitutionally vague or because it otherwise violates the non-delegation doctrine enunciated in R.I. Const. art. VI, 1 and 2. UTGR, Inc. subsequently intervened as a defendant. The superior court found in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Casino Act was not facially unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the strong presumption of constitutionality and the heavy burden of mounting a facial challenge, it could not be said that the Casino Act is facially unconstitutional. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State" on Justia Law

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC (SSR) applied for a license to place a casino in certain areas of Massachusetts. Caesars Entertainment Corporation and three Massachusetts affiliates (collectively, Caesars) were the proposed operators of the casino. The Massachusetts Gaming Commission issued an investigatory report concluding that Caesars was unsuitable as an operator, which caused Caesars to accede to SSR’s request that it withdraw from their contractual relationship. Caesars brought this action under 28 U.S.C. 1983 against certain Commission officials in their individual and official capacities and also brought a state law claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as beyond the scope of federal affordable relief and dismissed the state law claim as standing alone. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Caesars alleged no cognizable protected property interest, its Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (2) Caesars’ class-of-one Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim could not be recognized against a state actor given the breadth of discretion provided by the Massachusetts casino licensing statute. View "Caesars Mass. Dev. Co., LLC v. Crosby" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of a rule promulgated by the New York State Racing and Wagering Board (Respondent) mandating out-of-competition race horse drug testing. Petitioners commenced this hybrid article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding, alleging that the rule, referred to as the Out of Competition Testing Rule (OCTR) was not authorized by Respondent’s enabling legislation. Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that Respondent had acted in excess of its legislatively delegated power. The Appellate Division modified by effectively denying the petition, concluding that the OCTR was, for the most part, valid and that the rule’s promulgation lay within Respondent’s legislatively conferred authority to regulate and supervise race meets at which pari-mutuel wagering is permitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Respondent possesses the power to promulgate rules mandating warrantless, out-of-competition equine testing for proscribed doping agents. View "Ford v. N.Y. State Racing & Wagering Bd." on Justia Law

This case involved three establishments (collectively, Establishments) that ran promotional programs intended to attract patrons to their casinos. In essence, if the patrons joined an establishment’s club, they received coupons or credits called “free play” that allowed them to play slot machines without using any of their personal money. The Establishments sued the South Dakota Department of Revenue and Regulation requesting a declaration that free play was not part of adjusted gross proceeds and was therefore not subject to gaming tax. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Department, ruling that free play was not a deductible event in the calculation of adjusted gross revenue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant statutes and regulations do not include the value of free play for slot machines in the calculation of an establishment’s adjusted gross revenue, and therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling that the Establishments must remit gaming tax for the value of free play. View "First Gold, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue and Regulation" on Justia Law

Fla. Stat. 550.054(14)(a), effective July 1, 2010, sets forth the standards a holder of a permit to conduct jai alai must meet to convert the permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai. Two businesses d applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits on the day section 550.054 became effective. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR) granted the applications. Thereafter, Appellees instituted a declaratory judgment alleging that section 550.054(14) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the two businesses and DBPR, concluding that the statute was a general law. The First District reversed, concluding that section 550.054(14)(a) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute is a valid general law. View "Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Houston County Economic Development Authority ("HEDA") appealed a judgment condemning 691 allegedly illegal gambling devices, $288,657.68 in cash, and various documents allegedly related to illegal gambling. The Office of the Alabama Attorney General executed a search warrant at a bingo gaming facility known as Center Stage Alabama ("Center Stage") located in Houston County. HEDA sought, and was granted, the right to intervene in the forfeiture action (HEDA operated Center Stage). The electronic-gaming devices used in the operation of Center Stage were leased by HEDA from each gaming device's respective manufacturer or developer. HEDA purportedly operated Center Stage under a "Class C Special Permit to Operate Bingo Games" granted by the Houston County Commission to operate charitable bingo games under Amendment No. 569 to the Alabama Constitution of 1901. In addition to offering electronic gaming and Roubingo, Center Stage also offered traditional "paper bingo," live entertainment, and a bar. The trial court concluded that the devices, including the electronic devices, computer servers, and Roubingo tables, constituted illegal gambling devices. The trial court further concluded that the United States currency and other seized "gambling paraphernalia" was being used in connection with an illegal gambling operation. The trial court ordered that "the gambling devices ... be destroyed or otherwise disposed of by the State of Alabama" and ordered the State to deposit the seized currency into the State's General Fund. The trial court denied HEDA's postjudgment motion, and HEDA timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Houston County Economic Development Authority v. Alabama" on Justia Law

This matter came before the Court of Appeal for a third time; this matter stemmed from the California Valley Miwok Tribe's dispute with the Gambling Control Commission over money collected and held as a "non-compact tribe" under the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF). The Commission began withholding the distribution of RSTF funds to the Tribe when it became aware of a dispute over the tribe's membership and leadership as evidenced by ongoing proceedings and litigation involving the BIA's relationship with the Tribe. In its last opinion, the Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to lift a stay and to allow the parties to file dispositive motions. The parties filed their motions, and the trial court resolved them, entering judgment in favor of the Commission on its motion for summary judgment, which the Tribe then appealed. Finding that the Commission was properly withholding RSTF funds because it could not identify an undisputed tribal representative to receive them, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's decision. View "CA Valley Miwok Tribe v. CA Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief. View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law