Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Lauren Proctor and Trans-Union National Title Insurance Company brought this action against Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., d/b/a Rockaways Athletic Club ("Rockaways") and Pizza Man, Forrest Whitlark, Paul Whitlark, Charlie E. Bishop, and Brett Blanks (collectively "Defendants") seeking to recover money Proctor lost while gambling on video poker machines located at Rockaways and Pizza Man over the course of several years, including a time period following the South Carolina Legislature's ban of video poker in 2000. The circuit court granted Proctor's motion for partial summary judgment on her claim under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA") as to the liability of Defendants. In so ruling, the court found the Legislature had abrogated the doctrine of in pari delicto with regard to losses sustained by illegal gambling for public policy reasons. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the Legislature enacted specific gambling loss statutes as the exclusive remedy for a gambler seeking recovery of losses sustained by illegal gambling. By this opinion, the Court overruled its decisions that have implicitly authorized recovery beyond these statutes. As a result, the Court held that one engaged in illegal gambling could not recover under UTPA. However, based on the distinct facts of this case, the Court found that Proctor could pursue the portion of her UTPA claim for the losses she alleged that she sustained between 1999 and July 1, 2000, the day on which the ban on video poker became effective. View "Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark" on Justia Law

Revel opened an Atlantic City resort-casino, costing $2.4 billion. Revel entered into a 10-year lease with IDEA to run two nightclubs and a beach club. IDEA contributed $16 million of the projected cost of construction in addition to monthly rental payments. The Casino did not turn a profit. Revel filed a “Chapter 22” bankruptcy, seeking permission to sell its assets free of all liens and interests (including leases). The Bankruptcy Court approved and set an auction date. IDEA, concerned that the proposed sale would eliminate the value of its lease notwithstanding its $16 million investment, filed objections. No qualified buyer appeared. The court postponed the auction. A month later, Revel closed the Casino’s doors and barred tenants, IDEA gave notice that it intended to continue operating its beach club and nightclub and expected Revel to honor its obligations to provide uninterrupted utility service. In the meantime Polo agreed to buy the Casino for $90 million. Days before the sale hearing, Revel replied to IDEA’s objections. IDEA appealed an unfavorable order and sought a stay pending appeal, noting that, if the decision were not stayed, its appeal would be moot under 11 U.S.C. 363(m) once the sale closed. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit reversed, staying that part of the order that allowed Revel to sell the Casino free of IDEA’s lease. View "In re: Revel AC Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Gaming Commission and others, alleging that the Commission did not act in accordance with federal law in approving an ordinance and subsequent amendments to that ordinance that permitted the Seneca Nation to operate a class III gaming facility - a casino - on land owned by the Seneca Nation in Buffalo. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint in CACGEC III because the DOI and the NIGC’s determination that the Buffalo Parcel is eligible for class III gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701–2721, was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in violation of law; Congress intended the Buffalo Parcel to be subject to tribal jurisdiction, as required for the land to be eligible for gaming under IGRA; and IGRA Section 20’s prohibition of gaming on trust lands acquired after IGRA’s enactment in 1988, 25 U.S.C. 2719(a), does not apply to the Buffalo Parcel. Because the gaming ordinances at issue in the first two lawsuits (CACGEC I and CACGEC II) have been superseded by the most recent amended ordinance, the appeals of CACGEC I and CACGEC II are moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in CACGEC III and dismissed the appeals of CACGEC I and CACGEC II. View "Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cnty. v. Chaudhuri" on Justia Law

The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Tribe) petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 (S.B. 1011) as law. On March 30, 2015, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed S.B. 1011 with supermajorities. S.B. 1011 had one purpose: to repeal Idaho Code section 54-2512A, a law which allowed wagering on “historical” horse races. The Tribe alleged that the Governor did not return his veto for S.B. 1011 within the five-day deadline under the Idaho Constitution. The Tribe argued that because the veto was untimely, the bill automatically became law and the Secretary of State had a non-discretionary duty to certify it as law. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the Writ. View "Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his second amended complaint against Sony, alleging that Sony violated the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701, by retaining plaintiff's personally identifiable information beyond the Act's statutory limits, and disclosing his personal information between Sony entities. After carefully examining the legislative history, structure and language of 18 U.S.C. 2710 as a whole, the court agreed with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, and concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s unlawful retention claim for lack of a private right of action. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's unlawful disclosure claim because he failed to sufficiently allege that intra-corporate disclosures of consumers’ personal information between Sony entities to sustain the operations of the PlayStation Network violated the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rodriguez v. Sony Computer Entm't" on Justia Law

Alabama filed suit against PCI under state and federal law to enjoin gaming at casinos owned by the Poarch Band of Creek Indians and located on Indian lands within the state’s borders. The district court rejected Alabama's claims of public nuisance and dismissed the action based on defendant's tribal immunity or failure to state a claim for relief. The court affirmed, concluding that PCI was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity on all claims; the Individual defendants were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity as to Alabama’s state law claim but not its claim under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 18 U.S.C. 1166-68; and Alabama failed to state a claim for relief under the IGRA because 18 U.S.C. 1166 gives states no right of action to sue. View "Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth." on Justia Law

The 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. 3701, provides: It shall be unlawful for a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize or for a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games. PASPA exempts state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, and had an exception for New Jersey if New Jersey were to enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment. New Jersey did not do so. After voters approved a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, New Jersey enacted the Sports Wagering Act in 2012, providing for sports wagering at casinos and racetracks, under a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Sports leagues sued to enjoin the 2012 Law.The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined implementation of the 2012 Law. The Third Circuit affirmed. PASPA, by its terms, prohibits states from authorizing by law sports gambling, and the 2014 Law does exactly that. View "Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of N.J." on Justia Law

American Century, a mutual fund, offers investment portfolios, including Ultra Fund. Ultra Fund invested in PartyGaming, a Gibraltar company that facilitated internet gambling. In 2005, PartyGaming made an initial public offering of its stock, which was listed on the London Stock Exchange. In its prospectus, PartyGaming noted that the legality of online gaming was uncertain in several countries, including the U.S.; 87 percent of its revenue came from U.S. customers. PartyGaming acknowledged that “action by US authorities … prohibiting or restricting PartyGaming from offering online gaming in the US . . . could result in investors losing all or a very substantial part of their investment.” Ultra Fund purchased shares in PartyGaming totaling over $81 million. In 2006, following increased government enforcement against illegal internet gambling, the stock price dropped. Ultra Fund divested itself of PartyGaming, losing $16 million. Seidl, a shareholder, claimed negligence, waste, and breach of fiduciary duty against American Century. The company refused her demand to bring an action. Seidl brought a shareholder’s derivative action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Seidl could not bring suit where the company had declined to do so in a valid exercise of business judgment. The litigation committee adopted a reasonable methodology in conducting its investigation and reaching its conclusion. View "Seidl v. Am. Century Co., Inc" on Justia Law

Kaplan operated an illegal sports-booking business in New York that moved to Costa Rica in the 1990s. In 2004, the company went public on the London Stock Exchange. Before going public, Kaplan placed $98 million in trusts off the coast of France. Kaplan neglected to pay federal income or capital gains tax for the trusts for 2004 and 2005. In 2006, Kaplan was indicted for operating an illegal online gambling business within the U.S. Kaplan accepted a plea agreement, which stated: [N]othing contained in this document is meant to limit the rights and authority of the United States … to take any civil, civil tax or administrative action against the defendant. The court asked: Do you understand … that there is a difference between a criminal tax proceeding and a civil tax proceeding … that [this] doesn't preclude the initiation of any civil tax proceeding or administrative action against you? Kaplan replied, "I understand." The court sentenced Kaplan to 51 months of imprisonment, and ordered forfeiture of $43,650,000. Later, the IRS issued Kaplan a notice of deficiency with penalties, totaling more than $36,000,000. The Eighth Circuit affirmed: since Kaplan failed to file a return, the period to assess taxes never began to run; the plea agreement was unambiguous; and the government's failure to object to the Presentence Report did not prevent the government from bringing a civil tax proceeding. View "Kaplan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes and provides a different regulatory scheme for each class. “Non-banking” card games (including poker) can be either Class II or Class III gaming, depending on the laws of the state in which the gaming takes place, 25 U.S.C. 2703. Banking card games are those in which the casino participates “in the game, where the house takes on all players, collects from all losers, and pays all winners, and the house can win.” The Coeur d’Alene Tribe and the state executed a Compact authorizing the Tribe to offer Class III gaming. The parties failed to agree on the scope of gaming allowed by Idaho law. The state argued that Idaho law only permitted the state lottery and parimutuel betting, while the Tribe countered that it allowed “all games that contain the elements of chance and or skill, prize and consideration.” Idaho officials learned that the Tribe intended to offer Texas Hold’em at the Casino and obtained a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that tribal sovereign immunity was not abrogated and that venue was improper under the terms of the Tribal-State Gaming Compact and upholding the district court’s findings. View "State of Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene TribeRIBE" on Justia Law