Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was evicted from all properties owned, operated, or managed by Caesers Entertainment Corporation, which owns and operates a number of casinos throughout the United States. Plaintiff filed this action alleging that, under the common law and Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.0129(1)(e), Caesars could not exclude him without cause. The district court granted Caesars’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to section 463.0129, gaming establishments generally have the right to exclude any person from their premises, but the reason for exclusion must not be discriminatory or unlawful; and (2) Plaintiff failed to plead or demonstrate that his exclusion from Caesars’ properties was for unlawful reasons, and therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint. View "Slade v. Caesars Ent. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California resident and leading owner of thoroughbred race horses, claimed a bay filly in a claiming race at Churchill Downs in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration that certain Kentucky thoroughbred racing regulations that restrict the transfer and racing of claimed thoroughbreds (Article 6 restrictions) violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a sufficient case or controversy to sustain this action; but (2) Article 6 restrictions survive the strict scrutiny applicable to laws that appear facially discriminatory. View "Jamogotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama appealed circuit court orders dismissing the State's petition for forfeiture of certain electronic-gambling devices and related records and currency located at VictoryLand casino (appeal no. 1141044). In 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Circuit Judge Tom Young, Jr. to issue a search warrant "as to certain allegedly illegal gambling devices and related items" at the VictoryLand casino in Shorter. During the search, the State seized 1,615 gambling machines, $263,105.81 in currency, and related servers, terminals, and other equipment. Shortly thereafter, the State filed the forfeiture petitions at issue here. The Supreme Court, in response to a petition by the State, issued a writ of mandamus disqualifying Judge Young from presiding over the forfeiture proceeding. All the other eligible judges in the Fifth Judicial Circuit voluntarily recused themselves. Montgomery Circuit Judge William Shashy was appointed to preside over the case. Judge Shashy conducted a four-day bench trial. The State argued the machines seized were illegal gambling devices. Witnesses for KC Economic Development, LLC (KCED) testified that the intent of the voters who in 2003 ratified Macon County's "bingo amendment" was to legalize the very types of devices that had been seized. Nine months later, Judge Shashy entered an order dismissing the forfeiture action on equal-protection grounds, on the basis that the State tolerated at other locations in Alabama the operation of casinos that used the same type machines at issue in this forfeiture case. The order did not address the issue of the legality of the machines. KCED filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the trial court specifically find that the intent of the voters in approving Amendment No. 744 was to authorize the use in Macon County of electronic-gambling machines like those allegedly available at other locations in the State. KCED additionally requested that the trial court order that all the seized property be returned. The State disagreed that it had selectively enforced Alabama's gambling laws and contended that the equal-protection rationale was legally untenable. After a hearing, Judge Shashy issued an order that provided the findings of fact sought by KCED, and repeated his finding from his earlier order that the State was "cherry picking which facilities should remain open or closed" and thus was "not enforcing the law equally." Judge Shashy then entered a conditional order for return of the seized property. The State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the devices at issue here were not "bingo" machines, and therefore the "bingo amendment" as grounds for return of the machines was invalid. The Court reversed both circuit court orders and rendered a judgment for the State in appeal no. 1141044. The Court dismissed KCED's cross-appeal in appeal no. 1150027. View "KC Economic Development, LLC v. Alabama" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed challenges by petitioners SugarHouse HSP Gaming, LP (“SugarHouse”), then-present holder of a Category 2 slot machine license and operator of the Sugar House Casino in the City of Philadelphia, and Market East Associates (“Market East”), an unsuccessful applicant for that license. SugarHouse and Market East challenged the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board's (“Board”) grant of the last remaining Category 2 slot machine license for the City of Philadelphia to Stadium Casino, LLC (“Stadium”). Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court determined additional information was required on the issue of whether Stadium was ineligible to apply for a Category 2 license. The Board was affirmed in part and vacated in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, LP v. Pa. G.C.Bd." on Justia Law

The Nation and the State executed a gaming compact in 2002 pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. After the Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior and became effective in 2003, the Nation purchased an unincorporated parcel of land within the outer boundaries of Glendale, Arizona, pursuant to the federal Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act (LRA). Plaintiffs filed suit against the Nation seeking to enjoin the Nation's plan to conduct Class III gaming on Parcel 2. The district court granted summary judgment to the Nation. The court concluded that, under the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statutory text, the Nation plainly had “land claims” for damage to its reservation lands; were the court to find the term “land claim” to be ambiguous, and proceeded under Chevron to apply the DOI’s definition of the term, then the court would find that the Nation also had a claim concerning the impairment of title or other real property interest or loss of possession of its reservation land; and the district court did not err in determining that the LRA was a “settlement” of the Nation’s land claims. The court also concluded that the district court properly rejected plaintiffs' claims of judicial estoppel and waiver; the duly-executed Compact negotiated at length by sophisticated parties expressly authorizes the Nation to conduct gaming on its “Indian Lands,” subject to the requirements of section 2719 of IGRA; because Parcel 2 complies with the requirements of section 2719, and the Compact expressly allows the Nation to conduct Class III gaming there, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the Nation on plaintiffs’ breach of Compact claim; the Nation's choice to conduct Class III gaming in accordance with the express terms of the Compact does not deviate from the agreed common purpose of the Compact, and therefore does not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ non-Compact claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Tohono O'odham Nation" on Justia Law

This action raised several challenges to recently enacted legislation and administrative rules related to gambling in the state. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against several state entities challenging the constitutionality of video lottery terminals and H.B. 1, the act that authorized them, and legislative actions that related to Ohio’s four casinos, particularly H.B. 277 and H.B. 519. Lastly, Plaintiffs claimed that Ohio Const. art. XV, 6, H.B.1, H.B. 277, and H.B. 519 violate equal protection by granting a monopoly to the gaming operators whom the state approved. The trial court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the action for lack of standing and for failure to state claim, concluding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that they had organizational standing or standing based on their status as individuals experiencing the negative effects of gambling, parents and a teacher of public-school students, and contributors to the commercial-activity tax; and (2) one plaintiff, however, sufficiently alleged standing to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss his equal protection claim. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven entities who are collectively attempting to develop a casino-resort complex in the Catskills, filed suit under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, alleging that defendants entered into an anti-competitive scheme to obstruct plaintiffs' resort development. At issue is whether plaintiffs have alleged a plausible relevant geographic market for their casino-related products and services. In this case, plaintiffs define the relevant market as the Racing/Gaming Market in the Catskills Region. The court held that plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to define a plausible relevant geographic or product market for antitrust purposes, and that the district court properly dismissed their Sherman Act claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Concord Assoc., L.P. v. Entertainment Properties Trust" on Justia Law

Bettor Racing sought judicial review of NIGC finding that Bettor Racing had committed three violations of the Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2711(a), and NIGC's issuance of a Notice and Civil-Fine Assessment. The court concluded that the facts support NIGC’s finding that Bettor Racing (1) operated without an NIGC-approved management contract, (2) operated under two unapproved modifications, and (3) held the sole proprietary interest in the gaming operations. Therefore, the district court did not err in upholding the charged violations. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding the $5 million fine both reasonable and constitutional. Finally, the court rejected Bettor Racing's contention that NIGC violated its right to due process when the agency dismissed the case on summary judgment without a hearing because NIGC relied on undisputed facts in reaching its conclusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bettor Racing, Inc. v. National Indian Gaming Comm." on Justia Law

Two mothers and their sons alleged that Internet gambling websites owe them the money that the men lost in gambling. An Illinois statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who “knowingly establishes, maintains, or operates an Internet site that permits a person to play a game of chance or skill for money or other thing of value by means of the Internet or to make a wager upon the result of any [such] game,” 720 ILCS 5/28-1(a)(12) and “any person who knowingly permits any premises or property owned or occupied by him or under his control to be used as a gambling place.” It provides that “any person who by gambling shall lose to any other person, any sum of money or thing of value, amounting to the sum of $50 or more ... may sue for and recover ... in a civil action against the winner thereof.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The sons, who used the websites, failed to sue within six months of their losses. The government shut down the sites in 2011. The mothers, who never gambled on the sites, have timely claims, but the defendants are not the winners of any game that their sons played, but are the sites that hosted the gambling. View "Fahrner v. Tiltware, LLC" on Justia Law

The Debtors own the Atlantic City Trump Taj Mahal casino. The union represents 1,136 employees. The 2011 collective bargaining agreement was to remain in effect through September 14, 2014 and continue in full force and effect from year to year thereafter, unless either party served 60 days written notice of its intention to terminate, modify, or amend. In March 2014, the Debtors gave notice of their “intention to terminate, modify or amend” and sought to begin negotiations. The Union initially declined. On August 20 the parties met. The Debtors emphasized their critical financial situation. No agreement was reached. The Debtors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On September 11, the Debtors asked the Union to extend the term of the CBA. The Union refused. The CBA expired. On September 17, the Debtors sent the Union a proposal with supporting documentation. After meetings, the Debtors successfully moved, under section 1113, to reject the CBA and implement the terms of the Debtors’ last proposal, asserting that rejection of the CBA was necessary to the reorganization.While 11 U.S.C. 1103 allows a debtor to terminate a CBA under certain circumstances, the National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from unilaterally changing CBA terms even after its expiration; key terms of an expired CBA continue to govern until the parties reach a new agreement or bargain to impasse. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding section 1113 does not distinguish between the terms of an unexpired CBA and terms that continue to govern after the CBA expires. View "In re: Trump Entm't Resorts" on Justia Law