Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court focused on two appeals (case no. 1101384 and case no. 1110310) and two petitions for writs of mandamus (case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158) filed by the State of Alabama, all challenging orders entered by a circuit judge in Greene County requiring State officials to return to items seized by the State as contraband pursuant to search warrants previously issued by the Greene Court. In addition, the Supreme Court reviewed a petition for a writ of mandamus (case no. 1130598) filed by the State seeking relief from the refusal of a district judge in Greene County to issue warrants similar to the warrants involved in the first four cases based on evidentiary submissions similar to those provided by the State in those same four cases. The latter case involved the same potential defendants and gaming establishments as the first four cases, as well as similar gambling devices alleged by the State to be illegal. Moreover, the district judge in case no. 1130598 relied upon the judgment of the trial judge in the former cases in refusing to issue the warrants in that case. Upon review of the trial record of all parties' cases involved, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was asked to preemptively adjudicate (within the confines of a motion filed under Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P.) the lawfulness of property seized as contraband. The Court concluded the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to do so. Therefore the Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court in case no. 1101384 and 1110310 and dismissed those actions. The Court dismissed the appeals in those cases, and the related petitions for writ of mandamus then pending in case no. 1101313 and case no. 1110158. As to case no. 1130598, the Court, by separate order, granted the State's petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded this case for the immediate issuance of the warrants for which the State applied. View "Alabama v. Greenetrack, Inc. " on Justia Law

Defendants worked for Sports Off Shore (SOS), a gambling business based in Antigua. After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of violations of the Wire Act and other offenses for conducting an illegal gambling business. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding, as regarding Defendants’ common challenges to their convictions, that (1) the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the safe harbor provision of the Wire Act; (2) Defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence failed because the Wire Act applies to the internet; (3) Defendants could be convicted of violating the Wire Act despite their ignorance of the law; (4) Defendants’ convictions were not an improper extraterritorial application of the Wire Act; (5) there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendants even though SOS accepted bets on forms of gambling not covered by the Wire Act; and (6) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence a directory of all SOS employees. View "United States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Nathan Stallings leased a home in Mt. Pleasant where he lived with his fiancee and a roommate. He used an internet networking site to meet other poker players, and established a regular Sunday night game in his home. Players would buy into the game for a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $20. Respondents Robert Chimento, Scott Richards, Michael Williamson, Jeremy Brestel and John Willis were convicted in municipal court of violating S.C. Code Ann. 16-19-40(a) (2003) which made it unlawful to "play . . . in any house used as a place of gaming . . . any game with cards. . . ." after they were found playing Texas Hold'em and gambling in Stallings' home. On appeal, the circuit court reversed respondents’ convictions finding they were entitled to directed verdicts or, alternatively, that section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional. The municipal judge found, based on expert testimony presented by the respondents, that Texas Hold'em is a game of skill. The municipal judge also held that if a game of skill were without the ambit of gaming, then he would acquit the respondents, but that there was no clear indication whether the legislature intended to criminalize only gambling on games of chance. At the hearing, the municipal judge declined to find section 16-19-40 unconstitutional. The circuit court reversed, and the Town appealed that order. The issues before the Supreme Court were reduced to: (1) whether respondents were entitled to directed verdicts because betting money on a game of skill at a residence is not prohibited by section 16-19-40; and (2) if respondents were not entitled to directed verdicts, should their convictions have been set aside because section 16-19-40(a) was unconstitutional? The Court found that the circuit court erred in reversing respondents' convictions, and therefore the order on appeal is itself was reversed. View "Town of Mount Pleasant v. Chimento" on Justia Law

The State filed an in personam action pursuant to OCGA 16-14-6 (b) of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against Hargurtag Singh and his company Rajan Singh, LLC (collectively, "Singh"), seeking equitable relief including injunctive relief to stop the alienation of Singh's property and the appointment of a receiver over Singh's business and property. The complaint also sought the forfeiture of certain property as defendants in rem pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7. The complaint alleged that Singh was engaging in illegal gambling activity at its Clayton County business, Pure Gas Station, by paying out cash winnings to persons who played electronic gaming devices located in the store. On the same day the action was brought, the trial court granted the State's request that cash and equipment be seized and that certain assets be frozen; granted the State's request for a temporary restraining order; and granted the State's request that a receiver be placed in control of the business. The State and Singh subsequently entered into a consent agreement whereby Singh was allowed to resume operating the business under certain conditions and under the receiver's supervision. Hargurtag Singh later moved to dismiss the action on two grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, and (2) that the State's in personam forfeiture claims were unconstitutional. The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the State had sufficiently alleged violations of OCGA 16-12-22 and 16-12-28. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in, inter alia, "Cisco v. Georgia," (680 SE2d 831) (2009)) the trial court dismissed the State’s in personam claims because it determined that all civil in personam claims under the RICO statute were unconstitutional. The State appealed and Singh filed a cross appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Singh moved to dismiss contending that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction based on its view that the State failed to file an application for interlocutory review; the State contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the in personam defendant on grounds that claims under Georgia's RICO act were unconstitutional; and in the cross appeal, Singh contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Court reversed the decision pertaining to the in personam defendants, finding none of the subsections of OCGA 16-14-6 require proof of criminal conduct on the part of the in personam defendants, but allowed the superior court to enjoin any violations of OCGA 16-14-4 until the case was resolved; and, (3) Singh failed to show that there was no set of provable facts that would entitle the State to relief. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6) was sustained. View "Georgia v. Singh" on Justia Law

Antico was convicted of participating in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 23 1962(c), and illegal gambling, 18 U.S.C. 1955, and sentenced to 108 months in prison. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the racketeering conviction the sentence. The district court acted within its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury, based on Antico’s history of jury tampering and other factors. The court took reasonable measures to avoid prejudice, including a neutral explanation to the jurors. View "United States v. Pica " on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy or both, and other federal crimes, incident to years of participation in a criminal organization responsible for a large illegal gambling operation. The charged conduct involved sports betting, "football cards," and video poker that spawned criminal support activities such as money laundering, usurious lending, and extortionate collection of credit. The three male defendants also sought to burn down a business. Before trial, defendants jointly moved to suppress evidence obtained through a series of wiretaps. The district court denied the motion. All defendants were convicted of nearly all of the charges, and were sentenced to terms of 271 months, 216 months, 183 months, and (the female) 21 months. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting various challenges, including challenges to the wiretaps, and stating that there was no chance that innocent defendants were convicted. View "United States v. Albertelli" on Justia Law

This appeal focused on the legality of a video gaming device known as Bankshot, which was developed and distributed by Appellees. Appellees filed this lawsuit after the State seized two Bankshot devices as alleged illegal gambling devices, seeking a declaration that they were not illegal. The state agencies and officers who were named as defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that Bankshot was a "game of chance" and therefore an unlawful gambling device. The district court (1) found that Bankshot was a game of chance when played in some modes but not when played by others; (2) ultimately concluded that Bankshot was a gambling device under Nebraska law; and (3) refused the State's request for injunctive relief, reasoning that there was no showing that Appellees knowingly used Bankshot to advance unlawful gaming activity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying injunctive relief because (1) where the Bankshot game was reconfigured to comply with the terms of the district court order, injunctive relief completely banning the development and distribution of Bankshot in any form was not warranted; and (2) Bankshot, as currently configured, was not a game of chance. View "Am. Amusements Co. v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after plaintiff was arrested for, among other things, possession of false identification documents, when he reported to an agent with the Enforcement Division of the Nevada Gaming Control Board ("NGCB") that MGM management had unlawfully denied him payment of his tickets at their casinos. The agent arrested plaintiff after casino records indicated that he had previously redeemed tickets under two different names and the charges against plaintiff were later dismissed. At issue was whether plaintiff's false arrest/false imprisonment, battery, and premises liability claims were properly dismissed under Nevada law and whether plaintiff's false arrest and conspiracy to commit false arrest claims were properly dismissed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where plaintiff admitted to the agent that he possessed and used an unofficial identification card and credit card with a different name to gamble at several Las Vegas casinos; where plaintiff's admissions provided the agent with probable cause to believe he had committed a crime and therefore permitting the agent to arrest him; and where, as a result, plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state plausible claims for false arrest, conspiracy to commit false arrest, false imprisonment, and premises liability under state and federal law.View "Alex Fayer v. Arthur Vaughn, et al" on Justia Law

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law