Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, brought an action against defendant, who was the Commissioner of the Fisheries for the State of Alaska (Commissioner), asking the district court to declare that certain regulations, which shorten the fishing year and limited the number of salmon that commercial fishermen could harvest, were unconstitutional as a taking of property without just compensation and as a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their entry permits, that they had expressly waived any right to compensation with respect to their shore leases, and that they had not suffered a due process violation. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The court held that under Alaska law, plaintiffs have only a license, and not a protected property interest, in the entry permits. The court also held that plaintiffs contractually waived their right to challenge the regulations when they signed their lease agreements and the court declined to analyze their claims on the merits. The court further held that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Vandevere, et al. v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from trial court orders granting preliminary injunctions and appointing receivers to take control of the assets of certain stores and operate them. In each of the five stores, the state filed civil actions under the Georgia RICO statute, OCGA 16-14-1 et seq., and named as in personam defendants the purported owners and operators of the stores, alleging that defendants each engaged in two or more acts of illegal commercial gambling. Defendants appealed the trial court's order granting the state's motions for interlocutory injunctions, which continued in effect the terms of the temporary restraining orders and continued the receivership. The court held that a RICO forfeiture was a proceeding that could be initiated by the state pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7 and that the procedures surrounding the orders granting the injunctions and continuing the receiverships did not violate due process where defendants were afforded the opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments. The court also held that the trial court's consideration of the question of in rem forfeitures constituting unconstitutionally excessive fines was premature, and the cases must be remanded for consideration of those issues when properly presented. The court further held that the evidence presented did demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues where it recited equitable arguments of both parties; and that the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to recuse a judge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Patel, et al. v. State, et al.; Check, et al. v. State, et al.; Duhwala, et al. v. State, et al.; Patel, et al. v. State, et al.; Mehta, et al. v. State, et al." on Justia Law