Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

The State filed an in personam action pursuant to OCGA 16-14-6 (b) of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against Hargurtag Singh and his company Rajan Singh, LLC (collectively, "Singh"), seeking equitable relief including injunctive relief to stop the alienation of Singh's property and the appointment of a receiver over Singh's business and property. The complaint also sought the forfeiture of certain property as defendants in rem pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7. The complaint alleged that Singh was engaging in illegal gambling activity at its Clayton County business, Pure Gas Station, by paying out cash winnings to persons who played electronic gaming devices located in the store. On the same day the action was brought, the trial court granted the State's request that cash and equipment be seized and that certain assets be frozen; granted the State's request for a temporary restraining order; and granted the State's request that a receiver be placed in control of the business. The State and Singh subsequently entered into a consent agreement whereby Singh was allowed to resume operating the business under certain conditions and under the receiver's supervision. Hargurtag Singh later moved to dismiss the action on two grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, and (2) that the State's in personam forfeiture claims were unconstitutional. The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the State had sufficiently alleged violations of OCGA 16-12-22 and 16-12-28. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in, inter alia, "Cisco v. Georgia," (680 SE2d 831) (2009)) the trial court dismissed the State’s in personam claims because it determined that all civil in personam claims under the RICO statute were unconstitutional. The State appealed and Singh filed a cross appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Singh moved to dismiss contending that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction based on its view that the State failed to file an application for interlocutory review; the State contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the in personam defendant on grounds that claims under Georgia's RICO act were unconstitutional; and in the cross appeal, Singh contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Court reversed the decision pertaining to the in personam defendants, finding none of the subsections of OCGA 16-14-6 require proof of criminal conduct on the part of the in personam defendants, but allowed the superior court to enjoin any violations of OCGA 16-14-4 until the case was resolved; and, (3) Singh failed to show that there was no set of provable facts that would entitle the State to relief. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6) was sustained. View "Georgia v. Singh" on Justia Law

The federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721, establishes a cooperative federal-state-tribal regime for regulating gaming by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands. The Massachusetts Gaming Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K, sect. 3(a), establishes a licensing scheme and other standards for gaming. KG, a potential applicant for a gaming license, argued that the state Act provides unauthorized preferences to Indian tribes and on that basis treats the southeast section of the state differently, and this constitutes a classification on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and is inconsistent with congressional intent in the federal Indian gaming statute. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated with respect to the equal protection claim and otherwise affirmed. Whether the tribal provisions are "authorized" by the IGRA such that is subject to only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in this suit. There is apparently no judicial authority addressing the question of whether a state may negotiate a tribal-state compact with a federally recognized tribe that does not presently possess Indian lands. View "KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick" on Justia Law

Cancun Cyber Cafe and Business Center was an internet cafe and business center that operated a sweepstakes promotion whereby Cancun's customers could play casino-style video games to learn whether they had won prizes through the sweepstakes promotion. Cancun filed a complaint for emergency declaratory and injunctive relief and a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against the city, police chief, and county prosecuting attorney, seeking declarations that, inter alia, Cancun's business and sweepstakes promotion was lawful. The county attorney filed a motion to dismiss Cancun's complaint. The circuit court granted the motion and denied as moot Cancun's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was no existing legal controversy in this case, Cancun was not entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting the prosecuting attorney's motion to dismiss and denying as moot Cancun's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction. View "Cancun Cyber Cafe & Bus. Ctr., Inc. v. City of N. Little Rock" on Justia Law

In 2007, the house of delegates enacted legislation that proposed a constitutional amendment that would legalize video slot machine gambling in Maryland. During that same session, the state senate initiated companion legislation, an appropriations bill, contingent on the proposed constitutional amendment being ratified by the electorate, pursuant to which the gambling revenue would be appropriated and distributed. Each piece of legislation was passed by the general assembly and signed into law by the governor. Petitioners mounted an attack on both the contingent legislation and the constitutional amendment, arguing (1) the contingent legislation unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the voters, and (2) the ballot question language regarding the constitutional amendment was misleading and deficient. The Supreme Court addressed the first of Petitioners' contentions in Smigiel v. Franchot, in which it held that the legislation was constitutional. In this case, the Court (1) affirmed its holding in Smigiel; and (2) held that, regarding Petitioners' second contention, the ballot question language was sufficient, as it accurately conveyed the effect of the proposed amendment, and was neither misleading nor deficient. View "Stop Slots MD v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Appellant Willard Farr owned seven gaming machines seized from a Union business. The magistrate issued an order to destroy the machines, and Appellant timely sought a post-seizure hearing in an attempt to block their destruction. Following the hearing, the magistrate affirmed the order, and Appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented before the magistrate concerning the State's witness and her inability to identify which of the offending machines she played. Finding that Appellant misunderstood the burden of proof at the post-seizure hearing (which rested solely on the owner to show why the machines should not have been forfeited and destroyed), the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's and circuit court's decisions. View "Union County Sheriff's Office v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.View "Amador County, California v. Kenneth Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after plaintiff was arrested for, among other things, possession of false identification documents, when he reported to an agent with the Enforcement Division of the Nevada Gaming Control Board ("NGCB") that MGM management had unlawfully denied him payment of his tickets at their casinos. The agent arrested plaintiff after casino records indicated that he had previously redeemed tickets under two different names and the charges against plaintiff were later dismissed. At issue was whether plaintiff's false arrest/false imprisonment, battery, and premises liability claims were properly dismissed under Nevada law and whether plaintiff's false arrest and conspiracy to commit false arrest claims were properly dismissed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where plaintiff admitted to the agent that he possessed and used an unofficial identification card and credit card with a different name to gamble at several Las Vegas casinos; where plaintiff's admissions provided the agent with probable cause to believe he had committed a crime and therefore permitting the agent to arrest him; and where, as a result, plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state plausible claims for false arrest, conspiracy to commit false arrest, false imprisonment, and premises liability under state and federal law.View "Alex Fayer v. Arthur Vaughn, et al" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Sioux Falls requiring that an on-sale alcoholic beverage business seeking to place video lottery machines in the establishment must meet certain location requirements and apply for a conditional use permit. Plaintiff Rick Law, who conditionally held a liquor license, brought a declaratory action against the City to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The South Dakota Lottery intervened in the action. The circuit court ruled that the City exceeded its authority when it enacted the ordinance, concluding that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory scheme indicated that the State intended to fully occupy the field of video lottery to the exclusion of municipal regulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) municipalities do not have the freedom or power to regulate video lottery as the South Dakota Constitution specifically reserves that right to the State and (2) existing legislation does not give municipalities power to license video lottery establishments or otherwise control the location of such establishments. View "Law v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, commercial fishermen, brought an action against defendant, who was the Commissioner of the Fisheries for the State of Alaska (Commissioner), asking the district court to declare that certain regulations, which shorten the fishing year and limited the number of salmon that commercial fishermen could harvest, were unconstitutional as a taking of property without just compensation and as a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner, holding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in their entry permits, that they had expressly waived any right to compensation with respect to their shore leases, and that they had not suffered a due process violation. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed. The court held that under Alaska law, plaintiffs have only a license, and not a protected property interest, in the entry permits. The court also held that plaintiffs contractually waived their right to challenge the regulations when they signed their lease agreements and the court declined to analyze their claims on the merits. The court further held that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(e) did not violate plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Vandevere, et al. v. Lloyd" on Justia Law