Justia Gaming Law Opinion Summaries

The Nation filed suit against defendants contending that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701‐2721, preempts the application of a local anti‐gambling ordinance to a Nation‐owned gaming facility located on land owned by the tribe (the Lakeside facility). The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, following a motion for reconsideration, concluded that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, as it was not required to resolve questions of tribal law to hear the lawsuit. The court held that it was entitled to defer to the BIA's recognition of an individual as authorized to act on behalf of the Nation, notwithstanding the limited issue that occasioned that recognition. The court also concluded that the individual plaintiffs have standing to sue because they will suffer an injury distinct from any felt by the Nation. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cayuga Nation v. Tanner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California resident and leading owner of thoroughbred race horses, claimed a bay filly in a claiming race at Churchill Downs in Louisville, Kentucky. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration that certain Kentucky thoroughbred racing regulations that restrict the transfer and racing of claimed thoroughbreds (Article 6 restrictions) violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a sufficient case or controversy to sustain this action; but (2) Article 6 restrictions survive the strict scrutiny applicable to laws that appear facially discriminatory. View "Jamogotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama appealed circuit court orders dismissing the State's petition for forfeiture of certain electronic-gambling devices and related records and currency located at VictoryLand casino (appeal no. 1141044). In 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Circuit Judge Tom Young, Jr. to issue a search warrant "as to certain allegedly illegal gambling devices and related items" at the VictoryLand casino in Shorter. During the search, the State seized 1,615 gambling machines, $263,105.81 in currency, and related servers, terminals, and other equipment. Shortly thereafter, the State filed the forfeiture petitions at issue here. The Supreme Court, in response to a petition by the State, issued a writ of mandamus disqualifying Judge Young from presiding over the forfeiture proceeding. All the other eligible judges in the Fifth Judicial Circuit voluntarily recused themselves. Montgomery Circuit Judge William Shashy was appointed to preside over the case. Judge Shashy conducted a four-day bench trial. The State argued the machines seized were illegal gambling devices. Witnesses for KC Economic Development, LLC (KCED) testified that the intent of the voters who in 2003 ratified Macon County's "bingo amendment" was to legalize the very types of devices that had been seized. Nine months later, Judge Shashy entered an order dismissing the forfeiture action on equal-protection grounds, on the basis that the State tolerated at other locations in Alabama the operation of casinos that used the same type machines at issue in this forfeiture case. The order did not address the issue of the legality of the machines. KCED filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the trial court specifically find that the intent of the voters in approving Amendment No. 744 was to authorize the use in Macon County of electronic-gambling machines like those allegedly available at other locations in the State. KCED additionally requested that the trial court order that all the seized property be returned. The State disagreed that it had selectively enforced Alabama's gambling laws and contended that the equal-protection rationale was legally untenable. After a hearing, Judge Shashy issued an order that provided the findings of fact sought by KCED, and repeated his finding from his earlier order that the State was "cherry picking which facilities should remain open or closed" and thus was "not enforcing the law equally." Judge Shashy then entered a conditional order for return of the seized property. The State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the devices at issue here were not "bingo" machines, and therefore the "bingo amendment" as grounds for return of the machines was invalid. The Court reversed both circuit court orders and rendered a judgment for the State in appeal no. 1141044. The Court dismissed KCED's cross-appeal in appeal no. 1150027. View "KC Economic Development, LLC v. Alabama" on Justia Law

This action raised several challenges to recently enacted legislation and administrative rules related to gambling in the state. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against several state entities challenging the constitutionality of video lottery terminals and H.B. 1, the act that authorized them, and legislative actions that related to Ohio’s four casinos, particularly H.B. 277 and H.B. 519. Lastly, Plaintiffs claimed that Ohio Const. art. XV, 6, H.B.1, H.B. 277, and H.B. 519 violate equal protection by granting a monopoly to the gaming operators whom the state approved. The trial court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the action for lack of standing and for failure to state claim, concluding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that they had organizational standing or standing based on their status as individuals experiencing the negative effects of gambling, parents and a teacher of public-school students, and contributors to the commercial-activity tax; and (2) one plaintiff, however, sufficiently alleged standing to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss his equal protection claim. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich" on Justia Law

The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Tribe) petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to certify Senate Bill 1011 (S.B. 1011) as law. On March 30, 2015, both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed S.B. 1011 with supermajorities. S.B. 1011 had one purpose: to repeal Idaho Code section 54-2512A, a law which allowed wagering on “historical” horse races. The Tribe alleged that the Governor did not return his veto for S.B. 1011 within the five-day deadline under the Idaho Constitution. The Tribe argued that because the veto was untimely, the bill automatically became law and the Secretary of State had a non-discretionary duty to certify it as law. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the Writ. View "Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs held licenses from the Puerto Rico Treasury Department (Treasury) authorizing them to own and operate “adult entertainment machines” (AEMs). Special Treasury task-force agents later seized AEMs belonging to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued Defendants, the parties supposedly responsible for damages, in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the inspections and confiscations of the AEMs violated their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs also asserted supplemental local-law claims mirroring their federal-law claims. The court granted Defendants summary judgment on the federal law claims and relinquished jurisdiction over the local-law claims. The First Circuit (1) vacated the summary judgment on the search-and-seizure and local-law claims, holding that the case must be remanded so the district court can address timing and scope matters in the qualified-immunity context; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Rivera-Corraliza v. Puig-Morales" on Justia Law

The Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) filed a complaint against the State seeking a declaration that the Casino Act must be invalidated because it is unconstitutionally vague or because it otherwise violates the non-delegation doctrine enunciated in R.I. Const. art. VI, 1 and 2. UTGR, Inc. subsequently intervened as a defendant. The superior court found in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Casino Act was not facially unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the strong presumption of constitutionality and the heavy burden of mounting a facial challenge, it could not be said that the Casino Act is facially unconstitutional. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State" on Justia Law

Sterling Suffolk Racecourse, LLC (SSR) applied for a license to place a casino in certain areas of Massachusetts. Caesars Entertainment Corporation and three Massachusetts affiliates (collectively, Caesars) were the proposed operators of the casino. The Massachusetts Gaming Commission issued an investigatory report concluding that Caesars was unsuitable as an operator, which caused Caesars to accede to SSR’s request that it withdraw from their contractual relationship. Caesars brought this action under 28 U.S.C. 1983 against certain Commission officials in their individual and official capacities and also brought a state law claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the federal claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as beyond the scope of federal affordable relief and dismissed the state law claim as standing alone. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Caesars alleged no cognizable protected property interest, its Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim; and (2) Caesars’ class-of-one Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim could not be recognized against a state actor given the breadth of discretion provided by the Massachusetts casino licensing statute. View "Caesars Mass. Dev. Co., LLC v. Crosby" on Justia Law

Fla. Stat. 550.054(14)(a), effective July 1, 2010, sets forth the standards a holder of a permit to conduct jai alai must meet to convert the permit to a permit to conduct greyhound racing in lieu of jai alai. Two businesses d applied for the conversion of their jai alai permits on the day section 550.054 became effective. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (DBPR) granted the applications. Thereafter, Appellees instituted a declaratory judgment alleging that section 550.054(14) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the two businesses and DBPR, concluding that the statute was a general law. The First District reversed, concluding that section 550.054(14)(a) was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute is a valid general law. View "Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2009, intervenor-requestor James Schneller of Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against Gambling, sent an email to Catherine Stetler, a press aide in the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“GCB”), requesting copies of communications between the GCB and several applicants for gaming licenses, as well as copies of the financial data that each applicant provided to the GCB. He also asked for permission to speak at the GCB’s next public hearing, and copied his request to the GCB’s Director of Media Relations and Chief Enforcement Counsel. It was undisputed that requestor did not make mention of any open-records officer in his written request. The press aide responded to the written request by return email, wherein she apologized for having been out of the office and attached a public comment sign-up form with instructions to return the completed form for permission to comment at the GCB’s public hearing on the following day. The aide did not otherwise respond to the request for records, and did not forward the request to the GCB’s open-records officer. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the requirements for written Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) requests for access to public records, the proper application of the provision which directs that all such requests “must be addressed to the open-records officer.” The Court held that in order to establish a valid RTKL request sufficient to trigger appellate rights from a nonresponse under the RTKL, the requestor must address his request to the respective open-records officer as mandated in Section 703. View "PA Gaming Control Brd. v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law